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FORECLOSURE IN THE HEARTLAND:  WHAT 
DID WE LEARN? 
Abigail Lawlis Kuzma∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Indiana is still reeling from the foreclosure crisis.  In January 2015, 
Indiana was listed within the top ten highest foreclosure states in the 
nation.1 Earlier, in December 2014, one in every 1033 housing units 
received a foreclosure filing, while nationally, the rate was one in every 
1153 housing units.2  Further, the Indianapolis homeownership rate has 
fallen 13.5%—second only to Las Vegas in homeownership decline.3  
This is a particularly significant decline because eight years ago, 
Indianapolis boasted the highest homeownership rate in the nation.4 
This Article examines the causes and impact of the foreclosure crisis 
in Indiana and the Midwest.  It also identifies the federal and state 
responses to the crisis and analyzes their effectiveness.  The Attorney 
General Mortgage Multistate, combined with state efforts such as 
mediation and settlement conference legislative reforms, housing 
counseling networks, foreclosure hotlines, the Indiana Supreme Court 
Foreclosure Task Force, and court facilitator programs, have assisted 
homeowners to avoid foreclosure or at least minimize its financial 
devastation. 
II.  CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
The decade-long housing bubble that burst in late 2007 initiated a 
foreclosure crisis across America.  The crisis was felt across the country, 
but was particularly acute in Midwestern states such as Indiana.  The 
causes of the crisis, which are still debated today, are discussed below.  
Before examining the possible causes of the crisis, one must comprehend 
the enormity of the foreclosure crisis in the Midwest, particularly in 
Indiana.  This Article introduces the impact of the foreclosure crisis on 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Attorney General and Chief Counsel for the Division of Victim Services and 
Outreach, Indiana Attorney General’s Office.  The author thanks Jonathan Sichtermann, 
Lisa Wolf, Joshua Timmons, and Joshua Newton for their assistance with this Article. 
1 U.S. Foreclosures, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/mapsearch/us.html (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2Q8V-JA8J. 
2 Stacy Jones, Top Foreclosure States December:  Indiana, BANKRATE (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/state-foreclosures-indiana/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L8EH-4F65. 
3 See Jeff Swiatek, Home, Not So Sweet Home, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 25, 2012, at A1, 
available at 2012 WLNR 13210576 (referring to Census Bureau data compiled since 2006). 
4 Id. 
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the Midwest, followed by general causes of the financial crisis, and will 
specifically delve into the impact of mortgage fraud schemes in Indiana. 
A. Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on the Midwest 
The Midwest was devastated by foreclosures when the 1997–2007 
housing bubble burst, resulting in the 2008 financial crisis.5  When 
RealtyTrac released its October 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report, 
Indiana ranked among the top ten states with the most foreclosures, 
along with Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois.6  The worst-hit states fell into 
two categories:  states where speculators walked away from investment 
properties or states where a miserable economy exacerbated the effect of 
the housing crisis.7  The Midwestern states, including Indiana, fall into 
the second category.8 
In 2008, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio remained in the top ten states 
with the most foreclosures alongside states with significant investment 
housing, such as Nevada, Arizona, Florida, California, and Colorado.9  
                                                 
5 See Melinda Fulmer, State Ranked By Foreclosure Rates, MSN, 
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107814 (last visited Aug. 22, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HR72-NJYD (listing the markets most affected by 
foreclosure filings); Peter J. Wallison, The True Story of the Financial Crisis, 44 AM. 
SPECTATOR 12, 14 (May 2011) (discussing the financial crisis and subsequent housing 
bubble deflation and attributing the latter to the government’s housing policy).  See 
generally U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 2 Percent in October 2007, REALTYTRAC (Dec. 6, 
2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-activity-
increases-2-percent-in-october-2007-3465, archived at http://perma.cc/9LJG-56FH 
(providing foreclosure statistics and ranking states based on those statistics). 
6 Id.; see also Fulmer, supra note 5 (ranking the states by 2007 foreclosure rates). 
7 See U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 2 Percent in October 2007, supra note 5 (suggesting 
that states such as Florida, Nevada, and California are examples of states where speculators 
walked away because the states posted the top foreclosure rates). 
8 See Dina ElBoghdady, Housing Crisis Knocks Loudly in Michigan:  Foreclosures Hit Record 
Numbers as Region Continues to Lose Jobs, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR20070330021 
27_pf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N2ZG-44YC [hereinafter ElBoghdady, Housing 
Crisis Knocks] (stating that the Midwest mortgage crisis was “exacerbated by fundamental 
problems with [that region’s] economy”). 
9 See generally id. (suggesting that in the industrial Midwest there are “a record number 
of people missing their mortgage payments and [thus] losing their homes”); Steve 
McLinden, Top 10 States for Foreclosure, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/top-10-states-for-foreclosure-1.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AT69-8AY9, http://perma.cc/KCA6-2RCM (noting the 
housing boom’s effect on investment in Nevada, Florida, California, Arizona, and 
Michigan); Luke Mullins, The Top 10 Foreclosure States (as of August), U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Sept. 24, 2008, 4:07 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-home-
front/2008/09/24/the-top-10-foreclosure-states-as-of-august, archived at  http://perma.cc/ 
7U85-U9QN (listing the top ten foreclosure states as of August 2008, including Nevada, 
California, Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana).  See also Aldo Svaldi, 
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Detroit had the tenth highest metropolitan foreclosure rate in the nation, 
“[w]ith 4.52% of its housing units (one in [twenty-two]) receiving a 
foreclosure filing” in 2008.10 
Unemployment exacerbated foreclosure woes in the Midwest.11  
Indiana’s unemployment rate remained above 8% for over four and a 
half years, from December 2008 to August 2013.12  For sixteen 
consecutive months in 2009 and 2010, the rate swelled above 10%.13  
Other Midwest states, such as Ohio and Wisconsin, suffered similar 
fates.14  In Illinois, the unemployment rate started rising sharply in 2008, 
hovered over 11% for six months in 2009 and 2010, and remains above 
8% according to the latest data.15  Michigan’s unemployment rate peaked 
at 14.2% in mid-2009, and also remains above 8%.16 
B. Causes of the Financial Crisis 
Before we can determine the effectiveness of responses to the 
foreclosure crisis, it is critical to understand the causes, and thereby have 
the ability to determine, whether these responses have truly addressed 
the core problems.  Many authors have analyzed the housing and 
financial crisis which resulted in the ongoing foreclosure debacle.  Barry 
                                                                                                             
Colorado Bank Failures Exceed Expectations When Measured by Assets, DENV. POST (Aug. 28, 
2011), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_18773942, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
PH4X-4CNS (questioning the housing bubble’s effect on Colorado, but recognizing that a 
couple of key Colorado counties had “robust development” during the housing bubble). 
10 Foreclosure Activity Up 81% in ’08, BUS. J. (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://businessjournaldaily.com/foreclosure-activity-81-08-2009-1-6, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q6HM-NP7G. 
11 See Renae Merle, Rising Unemployment Levels Help Push Record Numbers of Homeowners 
into Delinquency or Foreclosure, WASH. POST (May 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR20090528017 
12.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LM3D-ST5Y (reviewing the effect of rising 
unemployment levels on foreclosure rates across the U.S.). 
12 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(Indiana) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST180000000000003, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T4UY-64VS. 
13 Id. 
14 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(Ohio) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST390000000000003, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NXA7-9PZA; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics (Wisconsin) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/ 
LASST550000000000003, archived at http://perma.cc/7UUR-7HNE. 
15 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(Illinois) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST170000000000003, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6J54-79SV. 
16 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
(Michigan) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST260000000000003, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7T9R-FQSY. 
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Ritholtz and Aaron Task list seven factors that led to the crisis, including 
the lack of regulatory oversight over instruments such as credit-default 
swaps and collateralized-debt obligations.17  They also list other causes, 
such as the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ 
inaccurate ratings, a payment structure in which investment banks pay 
their regulators, and investment banks’ increased leverage.18  Another 
author lists the banks’ ability to forum shop from an “alphabet soup” of 
bank regulators—the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.19 
Julia Patterson Forrester attributes the rise in subprime loans to the 
originate-to-distribute model of mortgage financing, which reduced the 
risk to mortgage originators and facilitated the proliferation of higher-
risk mortgages and the fragmentation of the mortgage originator 
market.20  She also cites the federal government’s preemption of state 
usury ceilings and consumer credit protection laws that restricted 
alternative mortgage financing as contributing factors.21 
                                                 
17 Barry Ritholtz, 7 Factors That Led to Crisis, THE BIG PICTURE (June 4, 2009, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/7-factors-that-led-to-crisis/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HYW4-LHDF; see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Would You Simplify the 
Financial-Reform Bill?  A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/08/19/how-would-you-simplify-the-financial-
reform-bill-a-freakonomics-quorum/, archived at http://perma.cc/S6W-RHD4 (discussing 
the Bailout Nation authors’ ideas on what could have been done to prevent the financial 
crisis).  “The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) exempted derivatives 
such as Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) from all 
regulatory oversight.  There were no reserve requirements, capital minimums, [and no] 
exchange listings[.]”  Id. (emphasis removed). 
18 See BARRY RITHOLTZ & AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION:  HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY 
CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 132, 143–44, 157–58 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009) (discussing the ratings agencies’ power, and using Enron as an 
example of the rating agencies’ incompetency); Dubner, supra note 17 (suggesting Ritholtz 
and Task’s criticism of ratings agencies indicated that rating agencies were essentially 
giving triple-A ratings to “junk” in return for payment from investment banks).  “Prior to 
2004, Wall Street firms were limited to 12-to-1 leverage by the 1975 net capitalization rule.  
In 2004, the five largest banks received a waiver, allowing their leverage to go up to 25, 30, 
even 40, to 1.”  Id. 
19 Adam Davidson & Melissa Block, U.S. Eyes Single Bank Regulator, NPR (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104679069, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R9W9-ZTHH. 
20 Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream:  A Critical Evaluation of the 
Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 381–83, 390–91, 
396 (1994). 
21 See id. at 398–401 (discussing Congress’ preemption of state law in an attempt to 
benefit the home mortgage market). 
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report in January 
2011.22  The Commission’s purpose was to explain the financial crisis’ 
cause, and all the members agreed that “the crisis was caused largely by 
the losses to financial institutions arising from the high rates of 
[mortgage] delinquency and failure among subprime and other low-
quality mortgages in the 1997–2007 housing bubble.”23  The Commission 
majority concluded “there was untrammeled growth in risky mortgages” 
and “[u]nsustainable, toxic loans polluted the financial system and 
fueled the housing bubble.”24  The report condemned abusive broker 
practices such as yield-spread premiums and toxic mortgage products.25 
Peter Wallison, a member of the commission minority, credited “the 
wholesale failure of bank and financial-institution managements,” and 
recognized the twenty-seven million subprime and other risky loans that 
existed in the U.S. financial system leading up to the financial crisis:  
“never in the past were half of all mortgages in the United States in 
                                                 
22 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:  FINAL REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4U6G-JMCC [hereinafter referred to as FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]. 
23 PETER J. WALLISON, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE LOST CAUSE:  
THE FAILURE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FIN. SERV. OUTLOOK 1, 1 (Jan.–
Feb. 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4LZ-KEDQ [hereinafter WALLISON, LOST CAUSE].  Wallison was a 
member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and wrote a dissent in the 
Commission’s Final Report.  Id.; see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 452 
(Wallison, dissenting) (arguing that U.S. housing policies—not “deregulation or lack of 
regulation, . . . predatory lending” or other factors cited in the report of the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission’s majority—were the major factors contributing to the 2008 financial 
crisis). 
24 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 101. 
25 See Tom Petruno, Mozilo Knew Hazardous Waste When He Saw It, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 
2009, 5:12 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2009/06/the-use-of-toxic-to-
describe-high-risk-mortgages-has-been-de-rigueur-for-the-last-two-years-now-it-looks-
like-countrywide.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QF8C-3A2K (stating that the term 
“toxic” is generally applied to loans that are disadvantageous to the borrower).  For 
example, in State v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide agreed to compensate 
homeowners who received Pay Option adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), defined as 
ARMs that, during an initial period (and subject to Recast) permit the borrower to choose 
among two or more payment options, including an interest-only payment and a minimum 
(or limited payment)—which may result in negative amortization—and Subprime 
Mortgage Loans defined as first-lien residential mortgage loans that combine higher risk 
features (such as low or no documentation, low equity, adjustable interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, cash-out financing) with higher risk borrower profiles (lower FICO 
scores, recent bankruptcies/foreclosures, major derogatory credit) resulting in a loan that 
could not reasonably be underwritten and approved as a “prime” loan.  State Farm v. 
Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 76C01-0808-PL-0652, slip op. at 9 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 2008). 
Lawlis Kuzma: Foreclosure in the Heartland:  What Did We Learn?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
44 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
danger of delinquency and default when a housing bubble deflated.”26  
Given these facts as a backdrop, Wallison focused on other factors, 
including the deterioration of underwriting standards, which were 
influenced by government programs beginning in the early 1990s when 
Congress “imposed . . . affordable housing requirements on Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.”27  Further, the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) “tightened and extended these 
requirements so that by 2007, [55%] of all loans had to qualify as 
affordable-housing loans to [low- and moderate-income (LMI)] 
borrowers.”28  This practice put Fannie and Freddie into competition for 
these loans with other banks who are required to make similar loans 
under the Community Reinvestment Act, causing the decline of 
underwriting standards.29 
C. The Impact of Mortgage Fraud Schemes in Indiana 
Besides the relaxed origination standards, proliferation of abusive 
sub-prime lending products, and a lack of regulatory oversight, 
mortgage fraud also contributed to the Midwest housing crisis.30  
Unfortunately, Indiana had its share of mortgage fraud cases that 
ultimately led to homeowner default and foreclosure, and the criminal 
conviction of the perpetrator(s).31 
                                                 
26  PETER J. WALLISON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, STATEMENT BEFORE THE 
HOUSING FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, 
16 (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter WALLISON, STATEMENT]; WALLISON, LOST CAUSE, supra note 
23, at 3. 
27 WALLISON, LOST CAUSE, supra note 23, at 3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Id at 4.  LMI borrowers are “home buyers whose income was at or below the median 
income in the areas where they lived.”  Id. 
29 Id.  Countrywide and other lenders were similarly operating under another HUD 
program, and “[w]ith all these agencies and firms seeking the same loans from the same 
group of potential borrowers, it was inevitable that underwriting standards would 
decline.”  Id. at 1. 
30 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 447 (discussing the role of 
predatory borrowers, who engaged in mortgage fraud, as another contributing factor to the 
financial crisis); see also Dennis Norman, Mortgage Fraud Continues to Climb—Midwest Leads 
the Way, ST. LOUIS REAL EST. NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://stlouisrealestatenews.com/financing/mortgage-fraud-continues-to-climb-midwest-
leads-the-way/, archived at http://perma.cc/U38K-F4ZK (discussing reported incidents of 
mortgage fraud in 2008 and 2009 and stating that Midwestern states have some of the 
highest concentrations of fraud). 
31 See Indictment at A6, United States v. Ross, No. 1:08-cr-0018-LJM-KPF (S.D. Ind. Jan. 
30, 2008) [hereinafter Ross Indictment] (describing that in 2008, Ross and Locke were 
indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and thirty-six counts of wire 
fraud and aiding and abetting).  Ross was also indicted for bankruptcy fraud based on 
allegations that she filed bankruptcy petitions in family members’ names without their 
consent.  Press Release, Living the High Life, FBI (May 17, 2011), 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 9
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The Beverly Ross and Donella Locke multi-million dollar mortgage-
fraud scheme is a classic example of the type of mortgage fraud 
committed from 2004 through 2008.32  Ross and Locke recruited buyers 
to purchase residential properties, who agreed to buy the identified 
property “in exchange for a sum of money” at closing.33  Often, a buyer 
was led to believe he or she was temporarily lending his or her credit 
information to assist someone with a lower credit score to buy a 
property.34 
Ross and Locke worked with “mortgage brokers, title companies, 
and appraisers to accomplish the sale of these properties to the recruited 
buyers [and] borrowers” and then received funds they were not entitled 
to receive from the closings.35  The investigation revealed that Ross and 
Locke falsified a variety of information on documents to defraud lenders, 
including income amounts, rent verifications, employment verifications, 
social security numbers, and business names.36 
“Throughout the [mortgage-fraud] scheme Donella Locke was a 
licensed real estate broker who operated Locke and Key Real Estate.”37  
The Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) brought charges before the 
                                                                                                             
http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/about-us/history-1/living-the-high-life, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T5X9-75T3. 
32 See United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 236–37 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the 
defendant’s actions and circumstances surrounding the mortgage fraud); Living the High 
Life, supra note 31 (reporting that Ross and Locke were part of a mortgage fraud scheme 
involving over $23 million). 
33 Ross Indictment, supra note 31, at A2.  The homes ranged in price from $300,000 to 
$1.4 million, and the aggregate loan value on these thirty-six properties was $23.5 million.  
Id. at A7–A10. 
34 Id. at A2–A3; Press Release, FBI, Second Defendant Sentenced in Mortgage Fraud 
Scheme (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/press-releases/2010/ 
ip021210a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/F5N6-DXED. 
35 Ross Indictment, supra note 31, at A2.  This mortgage fraud scheme also involved 
three other individuals:  an appraiser, a loan broker, and a settlement agent.  Id.  The article 
also describes two transactions in which Locke and Ross received illicit funds, including 
$28,980 in one and $204,500 in another.  Id. at A5–A6.  See Gabrielle J. Owens & Laura A. 
Turner, Regulatory Roundup from the Office of the Indiana Attorney General: Case Closed, IND. 
REALTOR ADVOC. (Aug. 2010), available at http://indianarealtors.com/Uploads/ 
Indiana_Realtor_Advocate/Attorney_General_8_20_10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
SJB5-PTNF (describing the investigation and the resulting charges filed against the other 
individuals involved). 
36 See Second Defendant Sentenced in Mortgage Fraud Scheme, supra note 34 (noting 
that these false statements induced lenders to make loans they otherwise would not have 
made); Gabrielle J. Owens, Regulatory Roundup from the Office of the Indiana Attorney General: 
Case Closed, IND. REALTOR ADVOC. (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.indianarealtors.com/uploads/indiana_realtor_advocate/Attorney_general_3
_19_10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FGK6-R3HA (explaining the false and misleading 
documents used to mislead lenders). 
37 Owens, supra note 36. 
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Indiana Professional Licensing Board in an administrative proceeding 
against Locke, and the Indiana Real Estate Commission summarily 
suspended her real estate broker’s license in April 2008.38  The 
commission found that Locke would “represent[] a clear and immediate 
danger to the public if she were allowed to continue to practice as a 
principal broker in the State of Indiana.”39  On September 18, 2009, a 
federal jury convicted Locke on five counts of wire fraud, and she was 
sentenced to prison for five years and eleven months and ordered to pay 
$2.3 million in restitution to thirteen lenders.40 
Mortgage defrauders also target people in financial trouble who are 
facing foreclosure.  For example, in State v. Shrader, the Respondent, 
Shrader, preyed on financially distressed homeowners who needed to 
sell their homes quickly.41  Shrader promised the homeowner that he 
could resolve their financial problems by “creat[ing] a trust, nam[ing] 
Shrader as the trustee, and then [have the homeowner] assign all 
beneficial interest in the trust to Shrader.”42  Instead of purchasing the 
home outright, Shrader convinced the homeowner that he would pay the 
mortgage with funds collected through leasing (or providing a lease with 
an option to purchase) to persons who needed to improve their credit.43  
In fact, Shrader did not make the mortgage payments but instead 
collected and pocketed the rent.44  Through this scheme, Shrader violated 
the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, the Home Loan Practices 
Act, and Indiana licensing law.45 
Shrader also committed mortgage fraud using short sales as his 
vehicle.46  In a scheme that has been coined “flopping,” the perpetrator 
buys real estate via the short sale process and then sells the real estate to 
a buyer who is willing to pay an amount higher than the short sale 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Locke’s conviction, but reversed the 
sentencing and restitution order.  United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d at 235, 248 (7th Cir. 
2011).  The court held that the trial court improperly considered conduct underlying 
charges against Locke that had been dismissed and ordered restitution without making 
sufficient findings of fact to support the order.  Id. at 245, 248. 
41 Complaint at 5–23, State v. Shrader, No. 29D01-1005-PL-570 (Sup. Ct. Hamilton Co. 
2010); Owens & Turner, supra note 35. 




46 See id. (explaining that the court enjoined Shrader “from committing deceptive acts in 
connection with real estate transactions” but noting that the matter was still pending at the 
time the piece was written). 
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price.47  In these transactions, Shrader approached distressed 
homeowners facing foreclosure and offered to negotiate a short sale with 
the lender.48  Meanwhile, he listed the property with a realtor at the same 
time that he entered into a purchase agreement with the homeowner.49  
Under this scheme, he “closed on the [short sale] [only] if he was able to 
locate a buyer who would pay more than the negotiated price of the 
short sale.”50  Then, after conducting back-to-back closings, he pocketed 
the difference between the short sale price and the true market sale price, 
defrauding both the lender and the homeowner.51  In this case, the court 
found that Shrader violated the Indiana Mortgage Rescue Protection 
Fraud Act by taking power of attorney from the homeowner for 
improper purposes, and also for “taking an equitable interest in the 
property to secure payment of his services.”52 
Many people who engage in flopping set up a limited liability 
company (“LLC”) to act as the straw buyer.53  The floppers also hide 
from the original seller the fact that there is a legitimate potential buyer 
for the property at the time of the floppers’ offer.54  Perpetrators may 
even advise property owners to stop paying an otherwise current 
mortgage to make the property eligible for a short sale.55  Floppers harm 
everyone involved in the transaction:  the property owner ends up 
potentially liable for the difference between the mortgage balance and 
the short sale price, the legitimate buyer pays an inflated price, and the 
lender takes a loss on a mortgage on a property for which there was a 
willing buyer.56 
                                                 
47 See Dina Elboghdady, Inspector General Says Changes to Making Home Affordable May 
Impede Help, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/20/AR2010042005182.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
DF2F-P2DH (noting that short sales involving struggling borrowers are vulnerable to 
flopping schemes). 





53 Nick Carey, Special Report:  Flipping, Flopping and Booming Mortgage Fraud, REUTERS 
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/us-housing-usa-fraud-
idUSTRE67G1S620100817, archived at http://perma.cc/5L7P-A35C. 
54 See Lew Sichelman, Short-Sale 'Flopping' May Be Next Big Housing Scam, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/05/business/la-fi-lew-20100905, 
archived at http://perma.cc/77U6-MEN7 (alerting homeowners to be wary if advised that 
the lender agrees to a price well below the home’s market value). 
55 Mortgage Scams:  Protect Yourself from Mortgage Fraud, MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE.ORG 
(2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20111207231947/http://www.mortgage-foreclosure. 
org/mortgage-scam.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L6V2-JL56. 
56 Catherine Reagor, Phoenix Real Estate Strategy of ‘Flopping’ Examined, AZCENTRAL.COM 
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/business/realestate/articles/2010/11/14/ 
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Since the foreclosure crisis hit Indiana, another common fraud is the 
mortgage-consultant scam.57  The OAG has sued almost 100 mortgage-
consultant companies involved in this scam.58  In a recent case filed 
against Foreclosure Assistance USA, Inc., the OAG’s complaint alleged 
that the mortgage-consultant company took up-front money from 
Indiana consumers without having a surety bond and made 
misrepresentations to Indiana consumers.59  The lawsuit identified 
nearly 600 consumers across Indiana who had contracts with Foreclosure 
Assistance USA.60  In the years since the foreclosure crisis hit Indiana, 
however, both federal and state governments have taken actions to 
lessen the impact of the crisis. 
III.  FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
The federal government took several steps to mitigate the 
foreclosure crisis.  Though none have been perfect, the programs, 
described below, responded to specific concerns raised by the 
foreclosure crisis.  First, Part III.A discusses the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (“HAMP”).61  Next, Part III.B introduces the 
                                                                                                             
20101114phoenix-real-estate-short-sale-flopping.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TVM4-
NYM2. 
57 See Mark Huffman, Indiana Stepping Up Anti-Foreclosure Efforts, CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20120503133748/http://www.consumer 
affairs.com/news04/2011/10/indiana-stepping-up-anti-foreclosure-efforts.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YN5U-NFBT (discussing the Indiana Attorney General’s efforts to 
combat scams by mortgage modification consultants). 
58 See Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Attorney General’s Office Sues Four 
Foreclosure Rescue Companies (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.in.gov/ 
activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=51948&information_id=1041
51&type=&syndicate=syndicate, archived at http://perma.cc/GV7L-ZHSB (noting that as 
of February 2012, the number of lawsuits initiated against the mortgage rescue companies 
had risen to ninety-five); see also Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Attorney 
General Targets Illegal Florida-Based Foreclosure Company (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/72230.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/TQP5-
7WEP (noting that the OAG had opened over five hundred investigations on foreclosure 
consultants since 2009). 
59 Complaint for Injunction, Restitution, Costs, and Civil Penalties at 4–5, 10, State v. 
Foreclosure Assistance USA, Inc., No. 2C01-1005-PL-50 (Cir. Ct. Allen Co. May 27, 2010) 
[hereinafter Foreclosure Assistance USA Complaint].  The case was dismissed after 
Foreclosure Assistance USA agreed to an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and $20,000 
in consumer restitution.  Moe Bedard, FA USA:  Indiana AG Goes after Ohio Loan Modification 
Firm with the Long Arm of the Law, LOANSAFE.ORG (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.loansafe.org/fa-usa-loan-modification, archived at http://perma.cc/YQU8-
32TT. 
60 Foreclosure Assistance USA Complaint, supra note 59.  On March 4, 2009, AVC signed 
the complaint, which included a claim for $20,000 in consumer restitution.  Id. 
61 See infra Part III.A (providing an overview of HAMP). 
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amendments made to Regulation Z.62  Finally, Part III.C ends with a 
discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act.63 
A. The HAMP Program 
The U.S. Treasury Department announced the details of HAMP on 
March 4, 2009.64  HAMP, a loan modification program, is part of the 
Making Home Affordable Program, and its purpose is “to reduce 
delinquent and at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments.”65  
Mortgages with an origination date before January 1, 2009 are eligible for 
HAMP and the program will remain in effect until December 31, 2015.66 
Individual mortgage companies had long set up loss-mitigation 
departments within their companies to contact homeowners who were in 
default and assist those homeowners in catching up or modifying their 
mortgage contracts so they could continue to pay their mortgages and 
stay in their home.67  In fact, long before HAMP was implemented, loss-
mitigation requirements existed that provided loan products guaranteed 
by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) or the Veterans 
Administration.68  These loss-mitigation alternatives included assisting 
the homeowner with entering into a repayment agreement with the 
                                                 
62 See infra Part III.B (introducing the amendments that were made to Regulation Z). 
63 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
64 Home Affordable Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC (2014), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/92HH-9YSA. 
65 Id.; see W. Justin Jacobs, Note, Help or Hamp(er)?  The Courts’ Reluctance to Provide the 
Right to a Private Action Under HAMP, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012) (discussing the 
implementation of HAMP). 
66 Jacobs, supra note 65; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama Administration 
Extends Application Deadline for the Making Home Affordable Program (May 30, 2013), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1959.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U8RQ-VMHF. 
67 See Harriet Newburger, Servicers Key to Limiting Loan Losses, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. 
(2007), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/cascade 
/66/01_limiting-loan-losses.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/QW6M-P3N6 (discussing 
servicers’ increase in loss mitigation activity, including the addition of units to their loss 
mitigation departments, as the number of delinquent loans increased).  
68 See, e.g., Loss Mitigation Policy & Guidance, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http:// 
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/sfh/nsc/lmmltrs (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/57T6-YTJZ (providing a list of loss 
mitigation documents, some of which pre-date HAMP); VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., 
CIRCULAR 26-10-6, REVISED VA MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/circulars/26_10_6.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RHT4-5YDH (indicating a history of loss-mitigation options before 
HAMP). 
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mortgage company.69  The homeowner might also be offered a loan 
modification, under which the lender would extend the loan term of the 
loan or reduce the loan’s interest rate so the homeowner could afford the 
monthly payments.70  FHA loss-mitigation also included a partial claim 
where funds would be advanced for a mortgagor to reinstate the 
delinquent loan, but that amount was not to exceed twelve months’ 
worth of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance.71  Finally, upon 
determining that the homeowner is not eligible for an alternative 
allowing the homeowner to remain in the home, the mortgagee may 
offer the homeowner a short sale or a deed in lieu of foreclosure.72  
Under these options, the homeowner must leave the home, but the 
arrearage that the homeowner would normally owe upon a judgment for 
foreclosure is waived.73  The homeowner is eligible for these loss-
mitigation options only if he or she demonstrates a hardship.74  
Mortgage companies outside of the HUD program could offer a loss-
mitigation option to homeowners with non-FHA loans.75  However, 
                                                 
69 Letter from John C. Weicher, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All Approved 
Mortgagees, Mortgagee Letter 2002-17, at 1–2 (Aug. 29, 2002), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_16808.doc (noting that 
under the repayment agreement, the homeowner paid the regular mortgage payment 
along with an additional amount per month for a stated period of time until the 
homeowner repaid the arrearage). 
70 Letter from William C. Apgar, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All Approved 
Mortgagees., Mortgagee Letter 00-05, at 18 (Jan. 19, 2000), available at 
http://api.ning.com/files/Y7XrEGzfaFcG-bsyrZIzSrXcKUJYI2SwJqF27S4YHYQ5LvHdc6f 
DCcAFirVLPganSTQdeZVTzDW03baM4EUSIS72XKlNywOt/MORTGAGEELETTER0005.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L2U3-2DYZ [hereafter Apgar Letter]. 
71 See Letter from John C. Weicher, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All 
Approved Mortgagees, Mortgagee Letter 2003-19, at 1 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Residential/2003/fha-03-19.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2JF7-TRDF (stating that when the mortgagor accepted the partial claim 
advance, he or she had to sign, “upon acceptance of the advance, . . . a promissory note and 
subordinate mortgage payable to HUD”). 
72 See Apgar Letter, supra note 70, at 29 (noting that under the short sale option, the 
mortgagee agrees to a sale of the home to a third party, under certain conditions or 
procedures, for a price below the arrearage owed).  Under the deed in lieu of foreclosure 
option, the mortgagee agrees by contract to accept the home.  Id. at 35. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 30, 36.  In other words, the homeowner must demonstrate that a hardship event 
occurred that caused the homeowner to get behind on the mortgage payments, such as the 
death of a spouse, the loss of a job, or an illness.  See id. (listing some circumstances that 
constitute a hardship). 
75 See, e.g., Bulletin from Patricia J. McClung, Vice Pres. Offerings Mgt., to All Freddie 
Mac Servicers, Bulletin No. 2009-28  (Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll0928.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z5G4-446G (announcing Freddie Mac’s changes to its own servicing 
guidelines in light of recent changes to HAMP); Announcement from Gwen Muse-Evans, 
Vice Pres. & Chief Risk Officer Credit Portfolio Mgmt., Fannie Mae, Updates to Fannie 
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these communications place the homeowner in an unequal negotiating 
position because he or she is not represented by a housing counselor, 
and the mortgage company has the upper hand with respect to 
information and power, which often results in unfavorable terms to the 
homeowner and frequently ends in default.76 
The HAMP program extends many of these loss-mitigation options 
to homeowners with loans held by mortgagees who agreed to comply 
with the HAMP program.77  HAMP, however, has not been as effective 
as expected in reducing foreclosure rates, and the program continues to 
receive criticism.  For example, “[t]he biggest complaint is that servicers 
take so long to review and approve short sales that potential buyers give 
up or walk away . . . even after the agent has spent hundreds of hours 
collecting paperwork and sending it to the servicer for approval.”78 
Another complaint is that servicers ignore guidelines altogether.79  
The June 2011 Treasury Report (“Report”) on the HAMP mortgage 
modification program rated Bank of America the worst in three of four 
categories, along with Wells Fargo and Chase.80  In fact, the Treasury 
Department suspended payment to these banks until they improved 
their compliance under the HAMP contracts.81  Further, the Report 
                                                                                                             
Mae’s Mortgage Modification Requirements, Announcement SVC-2011-03 (Apr. 4, 2011), 
available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2011/svc1103.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JL5J-5YQW (explaining an update to Fannie Mae’s guidelines 
requiring loan servicers to consider a range of loss mitigation options for defaulting 
borrowers). 
76 April Housing Scorecard Shows Growing Evidence of Economic Progress, RIS MEDIA (May 
10, 2011), http://rismedia.com/2011-05-09/april-housing-scorecard-shows-growing-
evidence-of-economic-progress/, archived at http://perma.cc/X82L-JH49 (explaining that 
HAMP loan modification programs have proven more sustainable than traditional 
industry loan modifications). 
77 Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program:  Overview, FANNIE MAE, 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/foreclosure_alternatives.jsp (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8X5A-WYL9. 
78 See Kate Berry & Marc Hochstein, Shortchanged?, 176 AM. BANKER 6, 6 (Jan. 6, 2011) 
(discussing complaints about HAFA). 
79 Id. 
80 Alan White, Too Big to Comply, CREDIT SLIPS (June 9, 2011, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/too-big-to-comply.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AY63-5AK6. 
81 DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE:  PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT 
THROUGH APRIL 2011, at 16 (June 9, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA 
%20Report%20FINAL.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/DEJ6-BZ7R.  Treasury resumed 
making HAMP incentive payments to Wells Fargo after one quarter, but continued to 
withhold payments to Bank of America and Chase.  DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE:  PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JULY 2011, at 18 (Sept. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-
Reports/Documents/July%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF, archived at 
Lawlis Kuzma: Foreclosure in the Heartland:  What Did We Learn?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
52 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
provided confirmation of what many homeowners, housing counselors, 
and lawyers had been experiencing:  “temporary agreements that never 
become permanent, servicers losing and misrecording borrower 
information, and not communicating effectively with homeowners about 
applications and decisions.”82 
The program is not reaching enough homeowners.  As noted by 
Alan White in June 2011: 
Only 30,000 HAMP modifications are being added each 
month, while new foreclosure starts hover around the 
150,000 to 200,000 per month level.  The number of 
temporary modifications in limbo past the [three month] 
program limit before becoming permanent is way down, 
except at the big three banks, which now account for 
half of all temporary [modifications] passing their six 
month mark.83 
Through November 2013, approximately 1.3 million borrowers received 
a permanent HAMP modification, less than 125,000 received a second-
lien modification under the Second Lien Modification Program (“2MP”), 
and less than 250,000 exited their homes through a short sale or deed in 
lieu of foreclosure under the HAFA program.84  This falls well short of 
the program’s goal of three to four million first lien modifications.85 
                                                                                                             
http://perma.cc/B4EU-4CJQ.  In its fourth quarter report, the Treasury noted that Bank of 
America had substantially remediated identified compliance issues and Chase had made 
progress in remediating compliance issues and withheld HAMP incentive payments would 
be paid to these servicers.  DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE:  PROGRAM 
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JANUARY 2012, at 20 (Mar. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/ 
Documents/Jan%202012%20MHA%20Report_WITH_SERVICER_ASSESSMENTS_FINAL.
PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/8MVN-KCS7. 
82 White, supra note 80. 
83 Id. 
84 DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT 
THROUGH NOVEMBER 2013, at 1 (Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/November%202013%20MHA%20 
Report%20Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8YFD-9J6N.  The 2MP was created to 
work in tandem with HAMP to assist homeowners who have a modification under HAMP 
but have a second mortgage on the same property and may provide a modification or 
principal reduction for that second mortgage.  Second Lien Modification Program (2MP), 
MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV (May 23, 2013) http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/ 
programs/lower-payments/Pages/lien_modification.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
FG7Y-JJBB. 
85 Press Release, Dep’t of Treas., Secretaries Geithner, Donovan Announce New Details 
of Making Home Affordable Program, Highlight Implementation Progress (May 14, 2009), 
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B. Amendments to Regulation Z 
In another response to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board 
(“FRB”) promulgated amendments to Regulation Z, implementing 
regulations for the Truth in Lending Act, effective October 1, 2009.86  The 
FRB recognized that the low- or no- documentation loans contributed to 
the burgeoning default rates and subsequent housing crisis by providing 
high-priced mortgages to high-risk borrowers.87  The Regulation Z 
amendments include restrictions on higher priced mortgage loans, which 
have a lower APR floor and contemplate purchase money mortgages.88  
The amendments also target deceptive advertising, which further clouds 
the already difficult to understand subprime mortgage packages, 
prohibits lenders and brokers from influencing appraisers, and prohibits 
servicers from engaging in unfair servicing practices related to fees and 
billing.89 
C. The Dodd-Frank Act 
In July 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).90  Title X of Dodd-Frank 
creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and details 
its duties and powers.91  Besides creating the CFPB, Dodd-Frank 
provides significant prohibitions and standards in mortgage lending.  
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, found in Title 
XIV of Dodd-Frank, substantially revises the Truth in Lending Act, 
including mortgage origination and servicing practices, as well as 
strengthens remedies available when lenders violate the law.92  For 
example, Title XIV builds upon the FRB’s 2008 reforms and delineates 
“qualified mortgage[s],” which are mortgages with safe underwriting 
practices, lower fees, and an absence of risky features.93  Because these 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg131.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XC6E-G4V9. 
86 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
226) (indicating that Section 226.35(b)(3) had a separate effective date of April 1, 2010). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 44,586–90, 44,563. 
90 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.). 
91 Id. at 1964–2035. 
92 Id. at 2136–2212. 
93 Id. at 2145–48.  On January 30, 2013 and June 12, 2013, the CFPB issued final 
regulations amending Regulation Z and implementing the ability-to-repay and qualified 
mortgage standards effective January 10, 2014.  Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage 
Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408–20 (Jan. 30, 
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qualified mortgages are sufficiently reliable and safe, the lender is 
entitled to a “safe harbor,” i.e., a conclusive presumption that it satisfied 
ability-to-pay requirements and a rebuttable presumption for higher-
priced mortgage loans under regulations implementing these statutory 
amendments.94 
Dodd-Frank also prohibits steering incentives and yield spread 
premiums, which are “payments made by a lender to a mortgage broker 
upon origination for placing the borrower in a loan with riskier 
terms . . . or a higher interest rate than the minimum rate required by the 
lender.”95  Yield spread premiums have long been considered predatory 
because they “provide[] a financial incentive for brokers to place 
borrowers into more expensive, and oftentimes typically more risky, 
mortgages”—the broker makes more money when he or she can 
convince the homeowner to purchase this less-desirable mortgage 
product.96 
Further, Dodd-Frank amended the Truth in Lending Act to require 
lenders to both verify the borrower’s income and ensure the borrower 
has the ability to repay the loan over its full term.97  While this provision 
seems perfectly logical, in the height of the housing boom of 2006 
through 2007, lenders were not verifying either the borrower’s ability to 
repay or the borrower’s income.98  As a result, “low-[document] loans 
accounted for roughly 40% of newly[-]issued mortgages . . . [,]” and 
“[f]or even riskier subprime loans, stated income loans may have 
                                                                                                             
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage 
Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430–506 (June 12, 
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
94 See generally Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and Guaranteed Single 
Family Mortgages, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,890 (Sept. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 201, 
203, 1005, 1007) (discussing the safe harbor presumptions). Clearly, a tension exists with 
respect to making loans available to qualified buyers while also ensuring that the buyer has 
the ability to pay. In October 2014, federal agencies loosened regulations to increase the 
flow of housing credit. "The government is in a tight spot. Some six years after the financial 
crisis, thousands of apparently creditworthy borrowers are being shut out of the housing 
market because they cannot get mortgages." Peter Eavis, U.S. Loosens Reins, but Mortgage 
Lenders Want More Slack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/u-s-loosens-reins-but-mortgage-lenders-want-
more-slack/, archived at http://perma.cc/C5Z7-6TAG.  
95 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 2139–41 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b); Linda Singer, Zachary Best, & Nina 
Simon, Breaking Down Financial Reform:  A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection Portions 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 
2, 6 (2010). 
96 Singer, supra note 95, at 6. 
97 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 2142–43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)). 
98 Singer, supra note 95, at 7. 
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exceeded 50%.”99  Moreover, evidence suggests that some banks were 
not only willing to accept falsified loan applications, but were even 
willing to help create them.100  A sample of 100 stated-income loans, 
when compared to IRS records, found that “90% of the income was 
exaggerated by 5% or more . . . [and] almost 60% of the stated amounts 
were exaggerated by more than 50%.”101 
Dodd-Frank also bans prepayment penalties for adjustable rate and 
higher cost mortgages that are not “qualified mortgage[s],” and a lender 
may not offer a fixed rate qualified loan with a prepayment penalty 
without also offering the borrower a loan without a prepayment 
penalty.102  Further, it addresses the teaser, or initial low payment rate, 
which is often dramatically adjusted upward after the introductory 
period.103  Under Dodd-Frank, lenders must provide a good faith 
estimate of the amount the monthly payment will be after it adjusts or 
resets.104 
The Act also provides additional protections.  Another predatory 
practice Dodd-Frank addresses is including premiums, financed into the 
mortgage’s principal, for expensive and often worthless credit or other 
insurance.105  The Act also requires six months’ notice before the 
mortgage interest rate resets from a fixed to a variable rate, as well as the 
establishment of an escrow account for payment of taxes and insurance 
                                                 
99 Stephane Fitch, No-Doc Mortgages Are Back?!, FORBES (July 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/02/return-liar-loans-personal-finance-no-doc_print. 
html, archived at http://perma.cc/945V-2DD5; Singer, supra note 95, at 7. 
100 Singer, supra note 95, at 7. 
101 Statement by Steven Krystofiak, Pres., Mortg. Brokers Ass’n for Responsible Lending, 
to the Federal Reserve (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
LG8E-37RQ (emphasis removed).  
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 2149–53 (2010). 
103 Id. at 2153–54. 
104 Id. at 2154. 
105 Singer, supra note 95, at 7.  Before Dodd-Frank, it was common practice in the 
subprime market to charge exorbitant premiums for unnecessary insurance, such as credit 
insurance, and finance these premiums into the mortgage principal.  Id.  But see 124 Stat. at 
2151 (stating that residential mortgage loans are to include credit unemployment insurance 
where “the unemployment insurance premiums are reasonable, the creditor receives no 
direct or indirect compensation in connection with the unemployment insurance 
premiums, and the unemployment insurance premiums are paid pursuant to another 
insurance contract and not paid to an affiliate of the creditor”).  Under Dodd-Frank, no 
residential mortgage loan secured by the homeowner’s principal dwelling may include 
financing of “any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment, or credit property 
insurance, or any other accident, loss-of-income, life, or health insurance[.]”  124 Stat. at 
2149–50. 
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for certain higher-cost mortgages.106  Unfortunately, during the housing 
boom, many homeowners refinanced into a loan they believed had a 
lower monthly payment, only to discover that their payments were 
actually higher because of taxes and insurance.107 
The Dodd-Frank Act also puts restrictions on the use of force-placed 
insurance, another predatory practice previously used by lenders.108  
Housing counselors and pro bono attorneys frequently encounter 
homeowners in disputes with their lenders over this issue.109  Force-
placed insurance is expensive hazard insurance that the servicer 
imposes.110  While the mortgage contract may allow this insurance, all 
too frequently, homeowners discover that this expensive insurance has 
been force-placed even when the homeowner already has the required 
insurance or when the servicer fails to cancel the force-placed policy after 
the homeowner obtains the required insurance.111 
One of the most interesting and potentially most effective aspects of 
this legislation is that state attorneys general can enforce its provisions in 
state court.112  It is too soon to assess Dodd-Frank’s impact, but it 
                                                 
106 Id. at 2154, 2178–81. 
107 Singer, supra note 95, at 8. 
108 124 Stat. at 2182–84 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006)).  CFPB issued regulations 
amending Regulation X and implementing the force-placed insurance restrictions, effective 
January 10, 2014.  Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10891–92 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1024). 
109 See generally Stacy Johnson, Next Bank Scandal?  Forced-Placed Homeowners Insurance, 
MONEY TALKS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.moneytalksnews.com/2010/ 
11/15/next-bank-rip-off-forced-place-homeowners-insurance, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
U3HU-PLR7 (discussing problems that are present when individuals are forced into 
foreclosure). 
110 Singer, supra note 95, at 8. 
111 See Jeff Horwitz, New Questions About Banks' Force-Placed Insurance Deals, AM. BANKER 
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_70/force-placed-insurance-
1035821-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1, archived at http://perma.cc/44RH-ZP3L 
(analyzing the concept of forced-placed insurance); Jeff Horwitz, Ties to Insurers Could Land 
Mortgage Servicers in More Trouble, AM. BANKER (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.american 
banker.com/issues/175_216/ties-to-insurers-servicers-in-trouble-1028474-1.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/SQ2E-PBHF (explaining the problems that are present with forced-
placed insurance).  See generally Johnson, supra note 109 (describing forced-placed 
insurance).  Force-placed insurance is generally much more expensive and covers much 
less than homeowners insurance obtained by a borrower.  See What’s in a Mortgage 
Payment? MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.homeloanlearningcenter.com/mortgage 
basics/whatsinamortgagepayment.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VQW8-YWYQ (providing a description of what a mortgage payment is). 
112 Singer, supra note 95, at 11.  Singer discusses: 
State attorneys general, and, as applicable, state regulators, can enforce 
not only their own non-preempted state laws against federally-
chartered banks and thrifts, but also the CFPB regulations (though not 
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specifically addresses many of the predatory practices seen during the 
housing boom—abuses that have contributed to the foreclosure crisis we 
continue to experience.113 
In addition to provisions outlined above, Dodd-Frank responded to 
criticisms that relaxed oversight and regulation contributed to the 
foreclosure crisis.  Specifically, Section 312 of Dodd-Frank mandates the 
transfer of all functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) by 
merging it with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the CFPB.114  The OTS was a government agency but 
did not receive a budget; instead, it was funded or paid by the financial 
institutions it regulated, thus creating a potential conflict of interest since 
it “depend[ed] on fees paid by the banks it regulates and compete[d] 
with other regulators to land the largest financial firms,” and was 
considered to have “an aggressively deregulatory stance toward the 
mortgage lenders it regulated.”115  A program of “This American Life” 
described a meeting where federal regulators were announcing a 
campaign to lessen regulation to attract clients.  At this meeting, a photo 
was taken with OTS Director Gilleran holding a chainsaw to indicate 
OTS’ willingness to cut through regulations.116  Not surprisingly, some of 
the mortgage lenders with the most notorious and toxic mortgage 
products—such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual—were among 
the financial institutions regulated by OTS.117  Despite this regulatory 
change, some argue that these rules may not prevent the next crisis.  For 
example, while the regulation tightened oversight of larger financial 
                                                                                                             
the general ban on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the 
absence of the rule).  Act §§ 1042(a)(2), 1047. Thus, federal law and 
regulations provide both an engine and a floor, not a ceiling, for 
enforcement. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
113 Id. at 13.  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report suggested that predatory 
practices during the housing boom, such as lenders offering complex mortgage products 
while targeting high-risk buyers, contributed to the current foreclosure crisis.  FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 447. 
114 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 312, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1522 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412). 
115 Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate over 
Enforcer:  Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/22/AR20081122022 
13.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P5M9-CXGH. 
116 This American Life:  The Watchmen, THE AMERICAN LIFE (June 5, 2009), http://www.this 
americanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/382/transcript, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
963M-4JD5. 
117 See Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 115 (analyzing OTS’s effectiveness as a 
regulator). 
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institutions, it exempted “small[] banks [who] could still choose their 
own regulator . . . [and] seek out the most lenient oversight.”118 
As noted above, the credit rating agencies (“CRAs”), such as 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, were also thought to contribute 
to the financial crisis through ratings of mortgage-backed securities 
which were ultimately found to be vastly less creditworthy than their 
original rating indicated, certainly not the “safe investment” that the 
rating implied.119  Similar to criticism of the payment system of the OTS, 
where the regulated entities choose and pay the agency that regulates 
them, the CRAs (aside from Egan-Jones) employ an “issuer pays” model:   
the “certified CRAs are paid by the issuers of the bonds that the CRA 
rates.”120  In fact, the Justice Department, the District of Columbia, and 
sixteen states, including Indiana and Illinois, have joined together to sue 
Standard & Poor’s for “misrepresenting its independence and objectivity 
when it placed high ratings on what were, in many cases, ‘worthless 
securities.’”121 
Alternatives to this payment model have been proposed, and Dodd-
Frank required the “[Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)] and 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) [to] submit reports that 
would investigate alternative business (revenue [and] compensation) 
                                                 
118 Daniel Wagner & Stevenson Jacobs, New Financial Rules Might Not Prevent the Next 
Crisis, HUFF. POST (May 23, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/23/new-
financial-rules-might_n_586511.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9H6J-RQZL. 
119 See generally Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies:  An Overview 2, 20–23 (N.Y.U. 
Stern Sch. Bus., Working Paper, Revised Draft May 19, 2013), available at http://web-
docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/economics/docs/workingpapers/2013/White_CRAsARFE_J
un2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B8F9-25WV (discussing CRAs and their role in the 
recent financial crisis). 
120 Id. at 9. 
121 Complaint at 3–5, State v. McGraw Hill Fin., Inc., No. 49D03-1306-PL-025757 (Marion 
Co. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2013); see Kristena Hansen, Arizona, Other States Sue Standard & Poor’s 
Over Ratings on Mortgage Investments, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2013/02/05/arizona-other-states-sue-
standard.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4HCE-QZP2 (discussing Arizona’s entry into 
the suit); see also Jessica M. Karmasek, Majority of States Suing S&P Say They’re Handling Case 
In-House, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Mar. 18, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/financial-
crisis/240202-majority-of-states-suing-sp-say-theyre-handling-case-in-house, archived at 
http://perma.cc/68FP-A3AK (providing details on how many states have joined the 
lawsuit); Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Indiana Files Lawsuit Against 
Standard & Poor’s (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/ 
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=108778&information_id=183780&type=&syn
dicate=syndicate (last visited Apr. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/89T-WC3W  
(providing details about Indiana’s suit against Standard & Poor’s); Rob Varnon, U.S. Ct and 
15 States Suing S&P Over MBS Ratings During Housing Boom, CONN. POST (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://blog.ctnews.com/financialmines/2013/02/05/its-official-u-s-suing-sp-over-mbs-
ratings-during-housing-boom/, archived at http://perma.cc/MKG8-3QF6. 
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models for CRAs . . . .”122  One proposal is to have the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) randomly select from a list of qualified 
CRAs for a particular bond issuer and that issuer would pay the CRA 
but also be able to hire additional CRAs.123  Nonetheless, at this time, 
CRAs (except Egan-Jones) are still paid by the issuer that seeks to have 
its bond rated.124 
IV.  STATE RESPONSES TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 
States have also undertaken efforts to mitigate the effects of the 
foreclosure crisis.  These efforts, described below, have made a 
significant contribution to addressing the fallout of the crisis and 
hardships faced by homeowners.  Part IV.A starts by introducing 
robosigning and servicer abuses.125  Next, Part IV.B attempts to protect 
individuals from these practices.126  Part IV.C further discusses the 
Midwestern attempts to solve the foreclosure problem.127  Finally, Part 
IV.D introduces the release of the Indiana Foreclosure Prevention 
Network.128 
A. Robosigning, Servicer Abuses, and the National Mortgage Foreclosure 
Multistate 
In October 2010, a number of newspapers began using the term 
“robosigning” to refer to the practice of a Bank of America official 
signing up to eight thousand foreclosure documents a month without 
reading them.129  Other allegations arose regarding improperly notarized 
documents and forged signatures.130  Additional major banks, including 
GMAC Mortgage and JPMorgan Chase, joined Bank of America in 
halting tens of thousands of foreclosure cases after similar problems in 
                                                 
122 White, supra note 119, at 28–30. 
123 Id. at 30. 
124 Id. at 9. 
125 See infra Part IV.A (explaining the concept of robosigning). 
126 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Indiana Mortgage Task Force). 
127  See infra Part IV.C (analyzing Midwestern attempts to solve foreclosure problems). 
128 See infra Part IV.D (discussing the Prevention Network and other foreclosure hotlines). 
129 See, e.g., Jenifer B. McKim, Lenders on Autopilot:  Using Robo-Signers to Process Thousands 
of Foreclosures Opens Banks Up to Legal Risks, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2010, at B7 (defining 
“robo-signers” as employees of lenders who blindly initial foreclosure paperwork without 
reading the documents). 
130 See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, 50 State Attorneys General Announce 
Foreclosure Probe, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/12/AR2010101205604.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
T4UD-X6YE (reporting on a multistate investigation aimed at determining whether lenders 
have been forging signatures and improperly notarizing documents). 
Lawlis Kuzma: Foreclosure in the Heartland:  What Did We Learn?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
60 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
their foreclosure departments became public.131  A Bank of America 
executive admitted, “I typically don’t read them because of the volume 
that we sign.”132  In the twenty-three states that utilize a judicial 
foreclosure proceeding, this admission raised questions as to whether 
these entities were submitting fraudulent documents to the court.133  The 
Summary Judgment and Default Judgment Affidavits, in which the issue 
arose, require the signer affirm, under penalty of perjury, that he or she 
has authorization to make the affidavit, he or she has personal 
knowledge of the content of the affidavit, and the information contained 
in the affidavit is factually correct.134 
The general outrage expressed in response to the robosigning 
debacle is understandable given the importance and implications of this 
practice.  It is critical to both the homeowner and the judicial process that 
the information in these affidavits be accurate.  The affidavit states the 
critical elements of the plaintiff’s case:  the plaintiff is the holder of the 
promissory note and thereby has the right to sue; the defendant is in 
default; and the total amount of the unpaid principal balance and the 
                                                 
131 See McKim, supra note 129 (discussing how other banks followed Bank of America’s 
lead in handling the foreclosure problems). 
132 Alan Zibel, Bank of America Delays Foreclosures in 23 States, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/2/bank-america-delays-foreclosures-
23-states/, archived at http://perma.cc/LMK5-5CUR.  The FHA suggests that Fannie Mae’s 
failure to oversee its attorney network through an operational risk management program 
contributed to the robosigning debacle.  See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFF. OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., EVALUATION OF FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE’S MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL 
RISK 12 (Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/EVL-2011-
004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZF-5837 (discussing Fannie Mae’s lack of an 
operational risk management program). 
133 EVALUATION OF FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 20 (discussing 
the possibility of fraudulent documents being filed with the courts); Zibel, supra note 132 
(distinguishing the “lengthy court process” in these twenty three states from non-judicial 
foreclosure states where lenders can quickly foreclose on delinquent borrowers). 
134 Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. And Cmty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) 
(testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law at Georgetown University of Law Center), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg63124/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg63124.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JBD3-FVVH.   “When a servicer files an affidavit that claims to 
be based on personal knowledge, but is not in fact based on personal knowledge, the 
servicer is committing a fraud on the court, and quite possibly perjury.”  Id.  The affidavit 
must state:  “I AFFIRM, UNDER THE PENALTIES FOR PERJURY, THAT THE 
FOREGOING REPRESENTATIONS ARE TRUE.”  See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion by Plaintiff, a “Person Entitled to Enforce” Note Pursuant to IC § 26-1-
3.1-301, for Summary and Default Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure at 
“Affidavit,” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Smidt, No. 29D01-1111-MF-11408 (Sup. Ct. Hamilton Co. 
Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Smidt Memorandum]. 
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due interest is owed.135  The affidavit also delineates advances, late 
charges, and costs of collection.136  Thus, if incorrect information is 
presented to the court, the homeowner may be adjudged to owe more 
money in arrearage after the home is sold than is actually owed, 
resulting in greater ongoing financial distress, and in many cases, the 
necessity that the homeowner file for bankruptcy protection.137 
Second, the homeowner is unrepresented in the vast majority of 
foreclosure cases.138  While some jurisdictions may have pro bono 
services available to the homeowner, he or she is in financial distress by 
facing foreclosure and is typically unable to afford to hire a private 
attorney.139  This is important because when both parties secure 
attorneys, the homeowner’s attorney will raise issues of inaccuracy or 
                                                 
135 Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra 
note 134, at 13. 
136 See Smidt Memorandum, supra note 134 (detailing the information that must be stated 
in an affidavit); Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage 
Servicing, supra note 134, at 15 (providing commentary on the problem of servicers charging 
"junk fees" related to foreclosure actions and the “growing evidence of servicers requesting 
payment for services not performed or for which there was no contractual right to 
payment”). 
137 A federal bankruptcy court found: 
There is no doubt that the unrelenting actions of [the mortgage 
servicer] drove the [homeowners] into bankruptcy.  They were not 
delinquent on any other debts, and they filed bankruptcy as an 
“eleventh hour” mechanism to prevent the loss of their home.  [The 
mortgage servicer’s] conduct throughout this factual scenario 
represents the most callous and egregious effort to collect an 
indebtedness that was never owed that this court has been called upon 
to review.  Succinctly stated, [the mortgage servicer’s] incompetent 
servicing tactics converted a loan transaction that was being paid like 
“clockwork” to a loan that was virtually impossible to pay, particularly 
for most modest income borrowers. 
In re Cothern, 442 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010). 
138 The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards:  Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Hous., 
Trans., and Cmty. Dev. 22, n.1 (May 12, 2011) (testimony of Diane E. Thompson, counsel for 
the National Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_ 
mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-thompson-mortgage-servicing-standards.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/75CG-LR9K [hereinafter The Need for National Mortgage 
Servicing Standards]. 
139 Brian Reed, Lawyers Make Pro Bono Leap into Foreclosures, NPR (May 17, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104063764, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6RAE-FWET.  In Indiana, the Supreme Court and the OAG partnered 
together to train more than 1000 pro bono attorneys to represent homeowners in 
foreclosure settlement conferences.  Press Release, Sup. Ct. of Ind., 1000 Trained to Handle 
Foreclosure Cases:  Indiana Supreme Court Offers New Pledge of Support (Oct. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/press/2009/1019b.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5AXG-V7M2. 
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mortgage fraud to the judge’s attention.140  In contrast, an unrepresented 
homeowner is not in a position to know if he or she has been victimized 
by fraud or if the information the plaintiff presented is correct—not only 
does the homeowner fail to raise objections, but in many instances, he or 
she does not even enter an appearance in the case.141 
It is not the judge’s role to represent the homeowner, and many 
judges rely on the honesty and integrity of the lender-plaintiffs and their 
attorneys.142  In fact, before the robosigning debacle, many judges 
assumed the paperwork presented to them was correct and therefore did 
not examine the claims of lender-plaintiffs carefully, almost rubber-
stamping uncontested foreclosure actions.143  Not surprisingly, attorneys 
representing lenders in foreclosure cases have also come under fire for 
allegedly filing fraudulent documents in foreclosure actions.144 
In response to the serious allegations involved in the execution of 
robosigned documents, attorneys general from all fifty states, as well as a 
number of federal agencies, joined together in a multistate investigation 
in October 2010 to examine the practices of mortgage lenders implicated 
in the robosigning debacle.145  This investigation ended in a joint federal 
                                                 
140 See The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards, supra note 138, at 22 (“Judges are 
unlikely to detect errors in a servicer's documentation where the homeowner goes 
unrepresented”). 
141 Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra 
note 134, at 12–13.  Levitin explains that “the norm in foreclosure cases is a default 
judgment.”  Id. at 12.  Further, “[m]ost borrowers do not appear in court or contest their 
foreclosures, and not all of those who do are represented by competent counsel, not least 
because of the difficulties in paying for counsel.”  Id. at 12–13. 
142 The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards, supra note 138, at 22. 
143 See Dean Calbreath, Foreclosure Procedure in Review:  ‘Foreclosure Mills’ and ‘Robo-
Signers’ Raise Questions About Integrity of the Paperwork with Homeowners, Buyers and 
Investors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 31, 2010, at C1 (discussing the judges’ lack of a role 
in foreclosures). 
144 John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/business/11lawyers.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/R4WT-GY7R. 
145 See PHILIP A. LEHMAN, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 1, available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mort
gage_Settlement/National_Settlement_Executive_Summary.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8VRS-ZXE5 (discussing the nationwide effort to investigate mortgage 
lenders); Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., 50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure 
Joint Statement (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.naag.org/joint-statement-of-the-
mortgage-foreclosure-multistate-group.php, archived at http://perma.cc/N7HJ-5BQH 
(“Fifty state Attorneys General have joined this coordinated multistate effort.”).  This group 
includes the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Government 
and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage 
Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), 
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and multistate settlement against the five largest lending servicers, and is 
the second-largest civil settlement ever obtained by the state attorneys 
general.146  The results of this investigation confirmed bank 
representatives routinely executed documents without personal 
knowledge of the facts contained therein and, frequently, without the 
presence of a notary public, in violation of law.147 
The settlement includes five major programs.  First, $1.5 billion will 
be distributed to homeowners who were victims of unfair mortgage 
servicing or foreclosure practices, each of whom will receive 
approximately $2000.148  Second, $2.5 billion will be distributed to the 
forty-nine participating states, which is to be used for state foreclosure 
prevention efforts such as housing counseling, help lines, mediation 
programs, legal services, and assistance for blighted neighborhoods.149 
Third, under the settlement, the banks are required to expend at least 
$3 billion on refinance programs “[t]o assist homeowners who are not 
delinquent on their payments but cannot refinance to lower rates 
because of negative equity.”150  To qualify for this refinance program, 
eligible homeowners “must be current on mortgage payments, have a 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3MAA-66LP. 
146 Federal Government & Attorneys General Reach Landmark Settlement with Major Banks, 
NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT (DEC. 8, 2014), http://www.nationalmortgage 
settlement.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/T3QC-MLBC.  Bank of America Corp., 
Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Residential Capital, LLC, and Wells Fargo 
& Company represent approximately 60% of the mortgage servicing market.  Adam J. 
Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25, n.73 (2011) (indicating 
that 60% of the market is comprised of the five largest mortgage providers); Nat’l Ass’n of 
Attorneys Gen. State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five 
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs (2013), available at 
http://naag.org/state-attorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largest-
mortgage-servicers-on-foreclosure-wrongs.php, archived at http://perma.cc/KLT7-R23P 
(explaining the $25 billion settlement with the mortgage servicers); LEHMAN, supra note 
145, at 1 (claiming that the settlement “represents the largest financial recovery obtained by 
the attorneys general except for the 1998 Master Tobacco Settlement”). 
147 Evan Bedard, Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, Part II; 
Statement by Sheila C. Bair, LOANSAFE.ORG (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.loansafe.org/ 
problems-in-mortgage-servicing-from-modification-to-foreclosure-part-ii-statement-by-
sheila-c-bair, archived at http://perma.cc/73XU-SPZ2. 
148 LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 4.  These homeowners do not have to release any private 
claims they may have against their lender to receive this payment.  Id. 
149 Id.  Oklahoma was the only state that did not join in the foreclosure settlement.  Loren 
Berlin & Emily Peck, National Mortgage Settlement:  States, Big Banks Reach $25 Billion Deal 
[Update], HUFF. POST (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/ 
national-mortgage-settlement_n_1265292.html, archived at http://perma.cc/45NC-MPJK. 
150 LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 2. 
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loan to value ratio in excess of 100%, and must have a current interest 
rate in excess of 5.25%.”151 
Fourth, the settlement provides for an enhanced loss-mitigation 
program, in which the five banks will expend approximately $17 billion 
in relief for persons who are delinquent on their mortgages.152  The banks 
are required to spend 60% of the $17 billion to reduce the principal 
balance of under-water home loans (principal reduction), and an 
additional $5.2 billion for other forms of homeowner relief, such as 
facilitation of short sales and homeowner unemployment payment 
forbearance which defers payments for homeowners who have lost or 
are between jobs.153 
Finally, the settlement includes more than forty pages of significant 
reforms of mortgage loan servicing.  Besides the robosigning allegations, 
homeowners have long been plagued by a variety of servicer errors and 
abuses.154  The Indiana OAG, as well as other offices of attorneys general, 
legal services programs, and housing counselors, receive thousands of 
homeowner complaints against servicers.155  Many of these borrowers 
are facing foreclosure and are seeking to save his or her home through a 
loss-mitigation option.156  Certainly the worst servicer abuse is wrongful 
or erroneous foreclosure.  One expert analyst in the foreclosure arena 
explains it this way: 
At this week’s hearings on mortgage servicing and 
robosigning . . . members of Congress asked the usual 
unimaginative question, “[A]ren’t all these borrowers 
delinquent, so that foreclosure is inevitable?”  The 
answer to this question comes in two parts: 
(1) No. 
(2) Even homeowners who are indeed delinquent 
should not be foreclosed in the current housing 
market if any reasonable workout is possible. 




154 Id. at 3. 
155 Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Mortgage Servicers Continue to Wrongfully 
Foreclose on Homeowners According to a Recent National Survey of Consumer Attorneys 
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/pr-wrongful-foreclosure-
survey-results.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SK8F-ZTXK. 
156 RoboSigning, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra 
note 134, at 7 (explaining that, “[l]oss mitigation is considered an alternative to foreclosure, 
and includes activities such as repayment plans, loan modifications, short sales, and deeds 
in lieu of foreclosure”). 
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Erroneous foreclosures thus come in two flavors.  
Foreclosing someone who is not actually behind, or 
whose default was precipitated by junk fees, 
unnecessary or overpriced forced-place insurance, or 
payment application errors (common in bankruptcy 
cases) is obviously wrong.  Equally wrong, however, are 
foreclosures of homeowners who have sufficient income 
to fund a modified loan that will produce significantly 
higher investor returns than a distressed foreclosure 
sale.  Contrary to the pronouncements of servicers and 
Treasury officials, modification and workout 
consideration is not happening before foreclosure starts, 
it runs on a parallel track with foreclosure processes.  
Frequently, the foreclosure train wins the race.157 
The Servicing Standards contain a number of critical reforms, found 
in Exhibit A of the settlement Consent Judgment.158  First, in response to 
the robosigning debacle, the settlement delineates standards for 
documents used in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings.159  For 
example, the servicer must ensure that factual assertions made in 
foreclosure pleadings or bankruptcy proofs of claim are accurate, 
complete, and supported by reliable evidence that substantiates the 
homeowner’s default and the servicer’s right to foreclose.160  Further, all 
affidavits, sworn statements, and declarations must be based on personal 
knowledge and submitted in accordance with the applicable state and 
federal law.161 
Another important reform requires servicers to send homeowners a 
notice before foreclosure that includes a summary of loss-mitigation 
options that were offered to the homeowner, facts supporting the 
lender’s right to foreclose, and a plain-language account summary.162  
The notice must also inform the homeowner that he or she may receive 
certain documents upon request, such as a copy of the loan note and the 
identity of the investor holding the loan.163 
                                                 
157 Alan White, Erroneous Foreclosures, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2010, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/11/erroneous-foreclosures.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X7R2-4Z59. 
158 See generally United States v. Bank of Am., No. 1:2012cv00361, Ex. A (D.D.C. 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/bank-of-america-consent-judgement.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/624L-TTQD (providing the critical reforms). 
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One of the most important reforms restricts “dual-tracking,” a 
practice in which the lender continues to pursue a judgment for 
foreclosure in court while simultaneously negotiating with the 
homeowner to preserve his or her home through a loss-mitigation 
option.164  Needless to say, this practice creates a tremendous amount of 
confusion at best and the appearance of deceit and unfairness at worst.165  
Under this dual-track system, the homeowner may receive a judgment 
for foreclosure while working in earnest with the servicer to provide 
information about the homeowner’s eligibility for a loss-mitigation 
workout.166 
Under the settlement, banks must thoroughly evaluate the 
homeowner for available loss-mitigation options before referral to an 
attorney to file for foreclosure.167  The servicer must cease all collection 
efforts if the homeowner is under review for a modification, and the 
servicer must halt foreclosure activities if the homeowner is current on a 
trial modification, forbearance, repayment plan, or if a short sale or 
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure has been approved by all parties.168  Further, 
if a sheriff sale is delayed for loss-mitigation purposes, the servicer must 
notify the homeowner of any new sale date.169 
Another important contribution of the settlement is the 
establishment of specific timelines for loan modification and short sale 
applications.170  Further, the servicer must assign a single point of contact 
(“SPOC”) to most first-lien borrowers and establish e-portals so that 
homeowners may be informed of their loan modification status and to 
ensure that documents submitted for loan modification consideration 
may be tracked.171 
These servicer reforms will be of tremendous assistance because one 
of the most problematic and ubiquitous of servicer abuses involves the 
                                                 
164 See Dean Calbreath, Some Want to Stop Dual Track of Loan Mods, Foreclosures:  Vargas 
Stopped Bill That Would Have Held Off Home Auctions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 17, 
2011), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/sep/17/some-want-stop-dual-track-
loan-mods-foreclosures/, archived at http://perma.cc/9TSB-AA2M (explaining the “dual-
track system”). 
165 See id. (noting that the dual-track system can be “‘unnecessarily confusing’”). 
166 Id. 
167 LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3. 
168 See id. at 1, 3 (noting servicers’ deceptive practices and the settlement’s attempt to curb 
those practices). 
169 Id. at 2–3. 
170 Id. at 3. 
171 Id. 
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difficulty homeowners have in communicating with servicers.172  To 
become eligible for a modification or other loss-mitigation option, the 
homeowner must fax a great deal of information to the lender and the 
court, including, among other things, recent bank account information 
and tax returns.173  Frequently, the servicer tells the homeowner the 
servicer failed to receive the information and the homeowner is 
repeatedly asked to send it again.174  In some instances, this 
communication error involves the transmission of a required signature 
on the document in which the homeowner accepts a loss-mitigation 
option.175  The homeowner sends the signed document to the servicer, 
often more than once, and then receives a notice that his or her loan 
modification was denied because the signed document was not sent in a 
timely manner.176  Homeowners are not the only ones who experience 
communication problems in the foreclosure process; the OAG, housing 
counselors, and legal services attorneys also experience communication 
breakdowns with servicers.177  Thus, the settlement also requires the 
establishment and use of a secure online e-portal system to enhance and 
track loss mitigation related communication.178 
                                                 
172 Complaint at 28, United States v. Bank of Am., No. 1:12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/scra_global_servicing 
comp.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ARF3-ZSLR. 
173 See IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-4.7 (2012) (defining the “‘loss mitigation package’”); 
Foreclosure Notices and Loss Mitigation Package, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION NETWORK 
(July 7, 2011), http://www.877gethope.org/news/foreclosure-notices-and-loss-mitigation-
package, archived at http://perma.cc/HQ9P-A8UR (discussing the requirement that the 
borrowers provide the lender and the court with a loss mitigation package); see also 
Settlement Conference Loss Mitigation Package Checklist, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 
NETWORK, http://www.877gethope.org/generated/Loss-Mitigation-Package.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4QEL-2FAJ (providing a checklist of 
required documents for the Loss Mitigation Package, including recent bills for all expenses, 
pay stubs for all employment, current bank statements, and tax returns from the last two 
years). 
174 See Press Release, Sup. Ct. of Ind., Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders 
and Borrowers Exchange Information (Apr. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/media-press-releases-2011.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JA2N-5BZ8 (discussing communication problems between major parties 
involved in foreclosure actions and suggesting that the implementation of the Mediation 
Portal Project will reduce these communication errors). 
175 See id. (noting that parties frequently fail to exchange important documents and 
communications in loss mitigation programs). 
176 See id. (suggesting that most of the loss mitigation efforts during the relevant periods 
were unsuccessful because the parties were unprepared). 
177 See id. (acknowledging instances where parties were failing to exchange proper 
documents and communications because of communication problems). 
178 See id. (explaining that the Mediation Portal Project is designed to improve 
communication between borrowers, counsel, and servicers in loss mitigation efforts). 
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Finally, the settlement imposes important restrictions on default fees, 
late fees, third-party fees, and force-placed insurance.179  For example, a 
servicer cannot charge loan modification application fees for proprietary 
(first or second liens) modifications, and attorneys may charge 
“reasonable and customary fees” for work actually performed.180  Thus, 
if the foreclosure is terminated because the homeowner has been 
accepted for a loss-mitigation option, the homeowner may be charged 
only for attorney work that was actually performed. 
The settlement will be enforced by an outside monitor who reports 
to state attorneys general, and servicers will have to pay significant 
penalties if found noncompliant with the settlement.181  The monitor has 
issued his fourth compliance report.182  Noncompliance may be enforced 
by the courts.183 
B. The Indiana Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force 
More than a year before the robosigning settlement was announced, 
the Indiana OAG acted quickly to protect homeowners from these 
ongoing servicer abuses and the robosigning debacle by filing a petition 
to the Indiana Supreme Court to establish Best Practices for mortgage 
foreclosure cases.184  The major substance of the Best Practices Petition 
grew out of a series of meetings and discussions of the Indiana Supreme 
Court Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force (“Task Force”), comprised of 
court employees, state judges, the OAG, legal services attorneys, and 
lender attorneys.185  The Task Force examined the robosigning issue as 
well as reported cases and common fact situations where homeowners 
                                                 
179 LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3. 
180 WASH. ATT’Y GEN, RETURN INTEGRITY & ACCURACY TO FORECLOSURE AND 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 8, available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/ 
About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_Settlement/Servicing%20Standards%20Hig
hlights.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PJ7S-J9GL. 
181 Id.; LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3–4. 
182 Continued Oversight, OFFICE OF MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/reports/continued-oversight/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/7V6M-RBPF. 
183 LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 1. 
184 Am. Pet. for an Order, In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS-
00003 (Ind. Jan. 5, 2001), available at http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/ 
files/Petition_SC_MortgageForeclosureBestPractices.FILESTAMPED.1.3.11.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/KSC8-499K [hereinafter In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices]. 
185 Press Release, Office of Ind. Att’y Gen., Best Practices Sought to Thwart Foreclosure 
Violations:  Zoeller Petitions Indiana Supreme Court to Set New Requirements for Lenders 
(Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/65076.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QKA5-2BJW. 
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faced abusive tactics by servicers.186  The Task Force developed Best 
Practices whereby Indiana courts could ensure the rule of law was being 
followed and homeowners facing foreclosure were properly protected.187 
The first few paragraphs of the Best Practices address the issue of 
documentation—has the plaintiff filed the appropriate paperwork to 
prove that he or she has the right to sue?188  A lender must do the 
following:  (1) demonstrate that it is a “person entitled to enforce” the 
mortgage; (2) state which Indiana code section it seeks to enforce, i.e., as 
a holder of the note or as a transferee; and (3) provide the proper 
documentation for that claim, including producing the original note if 
requested by the court or a copy of the note with endorsements as 
required by Indiana law.189  If the original note has been lost, the plaintiff 
must follow the required procedures and attach an affidavit setting forth 
the appropriate assertions.190 
While this documentation was already required under Indiana law, 
some lenders’ attorneys were flouting the law by failing to provide this 
necessary paperwork.191  Because most foreclosures are uncontested, and 
therefore, the homeowner is not represented by an attorney, lenders 
were unable to file adequate paperwork.192  Like robosigning, when the 
inadequate paperwork issue came to light, it created public outrage.  The 
                                                 
186 See id. (providing Attorney General Greg Zoeller’s description of the issues requested 
to be addressed by Indiana Supreme Court in the Petition). 
187 Id.  The OAG Petition contained stronger language than the Best Practices.  For 
example, the Petition sought to make the Best Practices requirements in foreclosure actions 
and it used the mandatory “shall” rather than the permissive “should.”  Am. Pet. for an 
Order, supra note 184, at 4.  The Petition called attention to the practice of robosigning and 
servicer abuses and prompted legislative changes.  Ultimately, in its Order, the Indiana 
Supreme Court concluded that, “in light of the relatively frequent changes within the 
mortgage industry . . . it would be more advantageous to keep these Best Practices fluid, 
and to request that they be continually updated by the Supreme Court’s Mortgage 
Foreclosure Task Force.”  In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS-3, 
slip op. at 2 (Ind. Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-other-
2011-94s00-1101-ms-3a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8QL5-6ZT3.  
188 See DIV. OF STATE CT. ADMIN., MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES 2 (Nov. 2012), 
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/mortgage-mortgage-foreclosure-
best-practices.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C9ZD-F8MB [hereinafter MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES] (delineating the assertions and documentation a, “person 
entitled to enforce,” a negotiable interest must provide to the court in a foreclosure action). 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
191 See Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, 
supra note 134, at 18 (noting that filing foreclosure complaints without attaching the note 
“appears to be routine practice” for some law firms). 
192 See id. at 12–13, 18 (discussing default judgments in foreclosure cases and noting that 
“[m]any foreclosure complaints are facially defective and should be dismissed because they 
fail to attach the note”). 
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press highlighted cases where courts voided foreclosures when it 
determined that the lender had failed to demonstrate a proper chain of 
title.193 
The Best Practices also require the courts to send a separate third 
notice to homeowners, alerting them of their right to seek a settlement 
conference.194  This additional notice enhances the effectiveness of the 
Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Court Assistance Project (“MFTCAP”), 
which was “created to assist trial courts in scheduling and conducting 
mortgage foreclosure settlement conferences.”195  Under this program, 
court-appointed facilitators contact homeowners facing foreclosure to 
“ensure they are aware of their right to a settlement conference, and to 
bring both parties to the table to try to find a mutually-agreeable 
settlement, or workout.”196  The MFTCAP began as a pilot program in 
February 2010, and its success has been striking.197  In MFTCAP pilot 
counties, nearly 47% of homeowners request a settlement conference, 
                                                 
193 See Gretchen Morgenson, Massachusetts Ruling on Foreclosures is a Warning to Banks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/ 
business/08mortgage.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8UQ-4R6T (discussing a 
Massachusetts court’s decision to void foreclosures based on incomplete paperwork). 
194 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3.  This would be the 
third notice requirement.  See IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8 (providing pre-suit notice 
requirements for creditors filing actions for foreclosure in Indiana).  The lender sends the 
first and second notices to the homeowner.  Id.  The first notice, sent thirty days before 
foreclosure is filed, informs the homeowner that foreclosure is imminent and gives 
information about contacting a housing counselor.  Id.  The homeowner receives the second 
notice as part of the summons attached to the foreclosure complaint.  Id.; see also DIV. ST. 
CT. ADMIN., MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE TRIAL COURT ASSISTANCE PROJECT, SAMPLE SUMMONS 
(FOR CREDITOR ATTORNEYS), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/ 
mortgage-summons.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K9T5-
UBJM (providing a sample summons).  The summons states: 
All courts should send a separate communication to each mortgage 
foreclosure defendant informing the defendant of his or her right to 
participate in a settlement conference.  The notice sent by the lender as 
required by the statute does not routinely generate an appreciable 
response rate, whereas the single-sheet notice sent by our pilot courts 
has resulted in a settlement conference request rate of approximately 
45 percent. 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3; see supra Part IV (explaining 
how mortgage fraud contributed to the Midwest housing crisis). 
195 James F. Maguire, Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Court Assistance Project, IND. CT. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://indianacourts.us/times/2010/09/mftcap/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HDC3-E469.  See Rebecca Berfanger, Court Programs, Economy Among 
Focuses of Foreclosure Conference, IND. LAWYER (Nov. 24, 2010), 
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/court-programs-economy-among-focuses-of-
foreclosure-conference/PARAMS/article/25214, archived at http://perma.cc/L2NW-BPJK 
(noting that the MFTCAP has been helping Indiana homeowners since March 2010). 
196 Maguire, supra note 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 See id. (praising the program’s success). 
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compared with fewer than 15% in counties without MFTCAP.198  
Further, 51.2% of the settlement conferences that take place in these pilot 
counties result in a workout.199  In short, though only twenty-six of the 
ninety-two Indiana counties participate in MFTCAP, 25% all Indiana 
borrowers negotiate a foreclosure-prevention agreement under this 
program.200  In contrast, the workout rate in counties without MFTCAP 
is substantially lower.201 
To further facilitate the MFTCAP’s effectiveness, the Best Practices 
also include a provision requiring lenders to provide more contact 
information for the homeowner than just the homeowner’s address.202  
To preserve the homeowner’s privacy and avoid further exposing the 
homeowner to foreclosure rescue scams, any additional contact 
information beyond the address is not publicly available.203  The Best 
Practices require the lender to file an affidavit regarding evidence that 
the homeowner no longer resides at the home and attach an exhibit 
detailing any default of an earlier foreclosure prevention agreement.204  
                                                 
198 The Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force and Settlement Conference Statistics, DIV. STATE CT. 
ADMIN., http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2364.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9QE5-T425. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id.  The Indiana Supreme Court estimates that “each averted foreclosure saves local 
communities and stakeholders around $40,000.”  Id.  Thus, “from April 2010 to December 
2013, the MFTCAP has preserved more than $217 million of value in Indiana 
communities.”  Id. 
202 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 2. 
203 Id.  The Best Practices state: 
At the time the Complaint is filed, Plaintiff should provide to the Clerk 
a service list, including the name, address, and, if available, the 
telephone number and/or email address for each individual defendant 
debtor who signed the mortgage.  Because many defendant debtors 
have been and continue to be targeted by illegal foreclosure “rescue 
agencies[,”] this service list should comport with the public access 
exclusions of Administrative Rule 9(H)(1). 
Id.  See supra Part IV.D (explaining the rise of foreclosure fraud by rescue agencies). 
204 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 187, at 3.  Best Practices further 
reads: 
If Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant does not qualify for a 
settlement conference under § 32-30-10.5-8(e)(1), loan secured by a 
dwelling not the debtor’s primary residence, then Plaintiff’s counsel 
should attach as an Exhibit to the Complaint any evidence in Plaintiff’s 
possession establishing that the debtor does not personally reside at 
such address.  If counsel cannot provide such evidence, the debtor 
should be sent a copy of the “Get Help—Get Hope” form prescribed 
by []§ 32-30-10.5[,] 
 
If Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant does not qualify for a 
settlement conference under []§ 32-30-10.5-8(e)(2), default of a prior 
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A false claim that the homeowner abandoned his or her home or that the 
homeowner defaulted on a previous loss-mitigation opportunity may 
result in the denial of the homeowner’s rights.205  Affidavits involved in 
the robosigning scandal contained mistakes where the lender incorrectly 
reported the terms of the note or stated an incorrect amount owed by the 
homeowner.206 
Like the multistate settlement resolving the robosigning debacle, the 
Indiana Best Practices also addresses a dual-track system.207  Under the 
Best Practices, if the homeowner requests a settlement conference to be 
reviewed for loss-mitigation eligibility, “no dispositive motions should 
be granted” until the conclusion of the settlement conference process.208  
Thus, the lender may not proceed with a motion for summary judgment, 
a motion for default, or a judgment for foreclosure.209  Further, “[i]f, at 
                                                                                                             
foreclosure prevention agreement under this chapter, then its counsel 
should attach as an Exhibit to the Complaint a copy of the foreclosure 
prevention agreement and a record of payments substantiating default. 
Id. 
205 See generally Indiana Foreclosure Laws, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/real-
estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/indiana-foreclosure-laws/indiana-foreclosure-laws/ (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/QYP6-9DUN (discussing Indiana 
foreclosure laws).  In Indiana, “[t]he foreclosure process begins [when] the lender files a 
complaint in court against the borrower.”  Id.  “The date the mortgage was executed 
controls the pre-foreclosure period between filing the complaint and the foreclosure sale.”  
Id.  However, “[t]here is no waiting period for abandoned properties.”  Id.  Therefore, if a 
lender wrongly concludes that a home has been abandoned, a homeowner may lose his or 
her right to a waiting period.  See Calbreath, supra note 164 (describing situations where 
lenders wrongly denied loss mitigation options to homeowners and eventually foreclosed 
on their homes even after the homeowners made timely payments under their supposed 
loan modification plans). 
206 Am. Pet. for an Order, supra note 184, at 2 (recognizing frequent mistakes on affidavits 
filed in Indiana courts, including failures to list the proper amount of the loan or the correct 
interest rate); see supra Part IV.A (noting that affidavits supporting summary judgment and 
default judgment were “robosigned” by employees, leading to many critical mistakes in 
these documents, which negatively impacted homeowners). 
207 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3 (disallowing dispositive 
motions once the defendant properly requests a settlement conference until the plaintiff, 
the defendant, or a court-appointed facilitator files a settlement conference report with the 
court). 
208 Id.  Best Practices states: 
If [the] Defendant requests a settlement conference under []§ 32-30-
10.5-9, no dispositive motions should be granted until one of the 
following occurs:  1) The court receives notice that the debtor and 
creditor have agreed to enter into a foreclosure prevention agreement; 
or 2) The court receives notice that the debtor and creditor are unable 
to agree on the terms of a foreclosure prevention agreement. 
Id. 
209 See A. Benjamin Spencer, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 704, 745 
(2d. ed., 2008) (explaining that summary judgment and default judgment are mechanisms 
to dispose of claims without a trial).  See also Foreclosure, IND. LEGAL SERVICES, (2004), 
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the settlement conference, the parties commence discussions regarding 
loss mitigation alternatives and conclude that additional information or 
documentation should be exchanged,” before the homeowner’s 
eligibility can be established, the settlement conference will be 
reconvened at a later date.210 
The Best Practices also clarify that if a homeowner requests a 
settlement conference, it will be treated as the homeowner’s appearance 
in the case so the homeowner will receive notice of any future court 
filings.211  However, these provisions only protect homeowners who 
request a settlement conference.212  While this is a welcomed safeguard, 
fewer than 42% of Indiana homeowners exercise their right for a 
settlement conference, leaving 58% of Indiana homeowners without 
these protections.213  If these remaining homeowners do not seek 
assistance from the OAG, a housing counselor, or a legal services 
attorney, they are likely to lose their homes.214  The Best Practices also 
                                                                                                             
available at http://archive-org.com/page/600935/2012-11-07/http://www.indianajustice. 
org/Data/DocumentLibrary/Documents/1099151393.21/view_article_publicweb?topic_id
=1621200&library=PublicWeb, archived at http://perma.cc/EF95-R5J4 (stating what a 
lender may not do). 
210 See MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3 (explaining that this 
creates cause to “reconvene the settlement conference at a later date, and dispositive 
motions should not be granted pursuant to § 32-30-10.5-8.5(b) until the settlement 
conference report has been submitted to the Court by the Plaintiff(s), Defendant(s), or a 
court-appointed facilitator”). 
211 See id. (“If Defendant requests a settlement conference under []§ 32-30-10.5-9, the court 
shall treat this request as the entry of an appearance in accordance with T.R. 3.1(B).”). 
212 See id. (establishing that these provisions only apply to homeowners who have 
actually requested a settlement conference). 
213 See Elizabeth Daulton, Robo-Signing and Settlement Conferences Among Issues Addressed 
in Recently Published Best Practices Guide (Jan. 31, 2011), http://indiana 
courts.us/times/2011/01/mortgage-foreclosure/, archived at http://perma.cc/HFR3-93KZ 
(noting that more than 40% of Indiana homeowners facing foreclosure have requested 
settlement conferences since the Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Assistance Program was 
introduced in the participating counties). 
214 See GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. REBUILDING AMERICA:  HOW STATES CAN 
SAVE MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 6 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-foreclosure-
mediation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GXU2-ZJUA (noting a 2011 study’s finding that 
“homeowners who received counseling were 1.7 times more likely to avoid a foreclosure 
sale than those who did not.”).  The OAG receives hundreds of complaints each year from 
homeowners struggling with servicers to find a loss mitigation option to save their home. 
Here are some common examples: 
 (1) Arbitrary Behavior on the Part of the Servicer.  The loan servicer 
placed the borrower in a three-month trial modification under HAMP 
with a permanent modification to follow.  The borrower made her first 
payment when due.  Two weeks later, however, the servicer 
unexpectedly removed the borrower from HAMP, claiming that 
securitization-related agreements between the investor and the 
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contain sanctions for attorneys or homeowners who do not comply with 
the legal requirements or who fail to abide by court directives.215  
Specifically, the Best Practices prohibit a lender from asking a 
                                                                                                             
servicer prevented the agreement with the borrower; subsequently, the 
borrower was denied her HAMP modification request.  Upon advice 
from her housing counselor, the borrower contacted the OAG.  After 
OAG intervention, the servicer agreed to abide by the HAMP trial 
modification agreement.  Note that the housing counselor was unable 
to resolve the crisis without the assistance of OAG attorneys.  In 
another case, the loan servicer offered to modify the borrowers’ FHA 
loan.  After the borrowers entered into a written loan modification 
agreement with the servicer, however, they were informed that FHA 
had not approved the loan modification, and it was denied.  After 
OAG intervention, the servicer offered the borrowers a four-month 
trial modification under FHA-HAMP, to be followed by a permanent 
modification.  The borrowers made their required four months of 
payments, but the servicer failed to send them a permanent 
modification until three months later.  The borrowers signed and 
returned the contract to the servicer, but they were rejected due to an 
issue with the agreement’s notarization.  The servicer informed the 
borrowers that it was going to proceed with foreclosure.  Again, after 
the OAG intervention, the servicer agreed to send a mobile notary to 
the borrowers’ house so that they could re-sign, and the notary could 
correctly notarize the modification.  The borrowers’ modification has 
now been applied to their account and they are current on their 
mortgage payments. 
 (2) Property taxes.  One loan servicer paid a borrower’s property 
tax installment three times over the course of a month, creating a 
deficiency in the borrower’s escrow account of over $1,500.  This 
caused the borrower’s monthly payment to increase drastically, and he 
was unable to persuade the servicer to fix the problem and readjust his 
payment.  After OAG intervention, the servicer obtained a refund of 
the overpayment from the county and reanalyzed the borrower’s 
escrow to bring his payment down to the correct amount.   
Notes of Abigail Kuzma (unpublished) (on file with author). 
215 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5.  The Best Practices 
state: 
If either party fails to attend the settlement conference or fails 
to abide by other court directives, appropriate sanctions may 
be considered.  Judges in St. Joseph and Allen counties have 
levied sanctions ranging from $150 to $2,500 on plaintiffs who 
repeatedly failed to attend a settlement conference or who 
refused to provide documents as requested by the court-
appointed facilitator.  A homeowner defendant who fails to 
attend the settlement conference may be perceived as waiving 
his or her right to a settlement conference, and the foreclosure 
should proceed as otherwise allowed by law. 
Id. 
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homeowner to waive his or her right to a settlement conference.216  This 
provision dissuades lenders from asking homeowners to waive their 
settlement conference rights to be considered for loss mitigation.217 
Further, the Best Practices contain provisions for post-judgment 
motions.218  These provisions resolve concerns that an attorney may 
attempt to overturn a previous loss-mitigation agreement, such as a short 
sale or a previously granted deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, to make the 
homeowner liable for forgiven indebtedness.  The Best Practices requires 
post-judgment motions to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment to 
state the reason for the request so the judge may be aware of the 
potential danger and may examine the motion.219  In addition, following 
the robosigning debacle, banks now review the veracity of previously 
filed affidavits and file a supplemental or substitute affidavit when a 
mistake is found.220  The Best Practices requires that any motion to 
overturn a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure “be noticed to all 
parties, including previously defaulted parties, and set for hearing.”221 
                                                 
216 Id.  “Defendant should not be asked by Plaintiff to waive his or her right to a 
settlement conference.  Such action on the Plaintiff’s behalf may be considered a 
sanctionable offense.”  Id. 
217 See Evan Bedard, Indiana AG Fights to Protect Borrowers’ Rights During Foreclosure, 
LOAN SAFE (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.loansafe.org/indiana-ag-fights-to-protect-
borrowers-rights-during-foreclosure, archived at http://perma.cc/64B3-9PTL (noting that 
the Indiana Supreme Court’s task force made recommendations based on a concern that 
some borrowers were not given the full opportunity to pursue loss mitigation options). 
218 See MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5.  The Best Practices 
states: 
Any motion to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment 
should state the reason for the request.  The 
borrowers/homeowner should be sent notice of the request.  
A petition to set aside a judgment that attempts to reinstate 
the loan should be allowed because of reinstatement or 
modification of the loan or other foreclosure prevention or 
loss mitigation agreement. 
Id. 
219 See id. (explaining that a motion to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment must 
include a reason for the request). 
220 See Robo-Signing Continues; Foreclosures Could Be Affected, PELLEY LAW OFFICE, LLP 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2011/Sep/380253.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/S5KH-WUAV (discussing robosigning settlements that require 
financial institutions to investigate their internal procedures and stop filing incorrect 
affidavits); see also supra Part IV (describing the nationwide investigation and settlement of 
the robosigning allegations and the various requirements ensuring protection for 
homeowners facing foreclosure). 
221 MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5 (“A party seeking to file 
a supplemental affidavit or substitute a previously filed affidavit must file a motion stating 
the grounds for the substitution.”). 
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Finally, before the robosigning settlement, the Indiana Division of 
State Court Administration developed a secure online portal system (“e-
portal”) to enable servicers and their local counsel to “effectively 
communicate with borrowers and their representatives regarding their 
mutual loss[-]mitigation efforts.”222  The goal is to “facilitate the 
exchange of necessary documents . . . [and] provid[e] a direct 
communication channel between all of the stakeholders[.]”223  The 
intended result is that “mediation sessions will become more productive 
and lead to more resolutions in less time.”224  The e-portal provides 
confirmation to both the homeowner and the servicer that a particular 
document was sent and has been received by the other party.225  
Therefore, the e-portal should reduce the communication disputes and 
errors that commonly plague the loss-mitigation process. 
C. Indiana Settlement Conference Legislation and Other Midwest Mediation 
Programs 
As noted above in Part IV.B, the Indiana Best Practices have assisted 
in preventing unneeded foreclosures and six of the Best Practices were 
                                                 
222 See Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and Borrowers Exchange 
Information, supra note 174 (discussing communication problems between major parties 
involved in foreclosure actions and suggesting that the implementation of the Mediation 
Portal Project will reduce these communication errors).  The portal may be accessed at 
www.dclmwp.com.  The basic procedures for the portal are as follows:  the Default 
Counsel electronically files a record of any new foreclosure and uploads the necessary 
documents from the Borrower.  Id.  A notification of the new foreclosure is then forwarded 
to a court-designated facilitator through the Portal, and the facilitator contacts the 
Borrower to determine if the Borrower wants to request a settlement conference.  Id.  If the 
Borrower requests a settlement conference, the facilitator refers the Borrower to a 
designated housing counselor, and the court issues an order requiring the conference.  Id.  
Next, the Default Counsel notifies the designated housing counselor through the Portal and 
gives the counselor access to the Borrower’s documents using a unique invitation code.  Id.  
The housing counselor works with the Borrower to upload any additional necessary 
documents to the Portal before the settlement conference.  Id.  Finally, after all of the 
Borrower’s documents have been uploaded, the Portal will automatically notify the Default 
Counsel that the Borrower’s package is complete.  Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing 
Lenders and Borrowers Exchange Information, supra note 174.  The Default Counsel will 
then review the package to ensure it is complete, and the settlement conference will 
proceed.  Id.; see also Welcome to The DMM Loss Mitigation Web Portal, DEFAULT MITIGATION 
MGMT., LLC (2014), https://www.dclmwp.com/Home, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
C8KW-LA5V (providing the web portal). 
223 Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and Borrowers Exchange 
Information, supra note 174. 
224 Id. 
225 See id. (describing the basic procedures of the Portal and the process of uploading 
documents). 
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codified into Indiana’s settlement conference law.226  According to the 
National Consumer Law Center, settlement conference and mediation 
programs have proven effective in saving homes from foreclosure.227  “If 
these programs are strengthened and expanded, they can prevent 
millions of foreclosures that will otherwise take place over the next 
several years.”228 
In 2009, the Indiana legislature passed Senate Enrolled Act 492 
(“SEA 492”), which became effective July 1, 2009 and strengthened 
Indiana’s unfair-and-deceptive-practices laws and created a foreclosure 
settlement conference procedure.229  SEA 492 amended the Indiana 
Home Loan Practices Act to prohibit a person from making 
misrepresentations that the person “reasonably should know” are 
misrepresentations.230  Actual knowledge of misrepresentation, 
especially in complex mortgage transactions, is notoriously difficult to 
prove; thus, expanded liability for constructive knowledge of 
misrepresentation or fraud will ease enforcement of consumer protection 
laws and ideally cut down on predatory practices. 
The stated purpose of the foreclosure settlement conference law “is 
to avoid unnecessary foreclosures [and to] facilitate the modification of 
residential mortgages in appropriate circumstances.”231  The law aims to 
achieve its purpose through increased notice and information 
requirements, a stay on foreclosure judgments, and a settlement 
conference provision that enables the homeowner to meet face-to-face 
with a lender’s representative who has authority to negotiate a loss-
mitigation workout on the lender’s behalf.232 
This law created two notice requirements.233  First, any creditor 
seeking to foreclose a debtor’s primary residence must send notice to the 
debtor at least thirty days before filing the foreclosure action.234  The 
                                                 
226 In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS-3, slip op. at 2 (Ind. Oct. 
7, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-other-2011-94s00-1101-ms-
3a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8QL5-6ZT3. 
227 See generally GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L. CONSUMER L. CTR., STATE AND LOCAL 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS:  CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 30 (2009), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-
mediation-programs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F7CG-2ABG (analyzing whether 
mitigation programs are capable of preventing homes from being foreclosed). 
228 WALSH, supra note 214, at 4. 
229 The Indiana legislature passed SEA 582 in 2011, which further strengthened these 
laws.  See generally IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5 (West Supp. 2013) (providing the foreclosure 
prevention agreements for residential mortgages). 
230 Id. § 24-9-3-7 (emphasis added). 
231 Id. § 32-30-10.5-1(b). 
232 Id. §§ 32-30-10.5-8, 8.5(b), 10(d). 
233 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8. 
234 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(a).  
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notice must inform the debtor that he or she is in default and encourage 
him or her to seek mortgage foreclosure counseling.235  Second, the 
lender must include a notice with the complaint, which must be served 
on the homeowner.236  This notice informs the homeowner of his or her 
right to a settlement conference.237  The onus is on the debtor to exercise 
that right and notify the court, within thirty days of being served, of his 
or her intent to participate.238  The court then schedules the settlement 
conference to take place within twenty-five to sixty days of the notice 
and encourages the debtor to seek mortgage foreclosure counseling 
before that date.239  Foreclosure judgments are stayed until both parties 
determine they are unable to reach a settlement agreement or the debtor 
fails to schedule a settlement conference.240 
In 2011, the Indiana General Assembly amended this settlement 
conference procedure to codify many of the provisions noted above in 
the OAG Best Practices Petition to the Indiana Supreme Court.241  
Despite the two-notice requirement already in existence and despite 
public awareness and homeowner efforts by the Indiana Foreclosure 
Prevention Network (“IFPN”), OAG, and the Indiana Supreme Court, 
few homeowners exercised their right to a settlement conference.242  
Therefore, SEA 582, passed in 2011, added an additional notice 
requirement whereby the court will contact all homeowners after a 
foreclosure has been filed.243  In addition, the lender must provide the 
court with the most recent contact information available for the 
homeowner to facilitate this contact by the court.244  Further, while the 
original settlement conference provisions outlined the documentation 
“needed to engage in good faith negotiations,” with the court 
facilitator—who makes contact with the homeowner under these recent 
                                                 
235 IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8(a)(1).  The notice must also contain contact information for 
the IFPN.  Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(a)(2). 
236 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(c). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(1)(B); IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(1)–(2). This scheduling 
window is within forty to sixty days of the notice for all foreclosure actions filed after June 
30, 2011. 
240 Id. § 32-30-10.5-9(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
241 See supra Part IV.C (discussing various provisions of the Petition and explaining the 
servicer abuses the provisions seek to correct). 
242 Elizabeth Daulton, Michael Gotsch & Nancy Boyer, Settling for Foreclosure?  The 
Mortgage Foreclosure Settlement Conference (2010), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/ 
center/files/jedu-lib-foreclosure-mortgage-foreclosure.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
453W-RB6N. 
243 IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8(d)(2) (West Supp. 2013). 
244 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(d)(2)(B). 
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amendments—will also assist in gathering this required documentation 
and, where possible, the Portal is then used to eliminate confusion.245 
Similarly, there is confusion about the requirement that foreclosure 
judgments are stayed until both parties determine they are unable to 
reach a settlement.246  Therefore, the new amendments codify the Best 
Practices Petition provision providing that dispositive motions are 
stayed until the court receives notice regarding the outcome of 
negotiations at the conclusion of the settlement conference.247  Thus, the 
dual-track issue is resolved for those who seek a settlement conference.  
Further, SEA 582 codified the Best Practices provision that deems the 
homeowner’s request for a settlement conference as an appearance.248  
This Act also codified the Best Practices provision that allows the judge 
to award civil penalties or sanctions when he or she deems it 
appropriate.249  These funds will benefit programs that promote 
foreclosure prevention.250 
Finally, SEA 582 introduces an entirely new concept into the 
settlement conference arena.  During the foreclosure proceeding, the 
court may issue a provisional order to collect payments from 
homeowners, based on the homeowner’s ability to pay.251  Homeowners 
will pay these funds to the clerk of the court or into an attorney trust 
account.252  As soon as a homeowner goes into default, the lender will 
often refuse further monthly payments unless the homeowner can bring 
the loan current.253  In some instances, this may mean that the 
homeowner is not making a regular monthly housing payment for 
months.  This provision allows the homeowner to continue making 
affordable monthly payments while the homeowner’s loss-mitigation 
eligibility is being processed; however, SEA 582 also clarifies that the 
                                                 
245 Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(3)(B)(i); see Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and 
Borrowers Exchange Information, supra note 174 (discussing the online portals and the 
importance of communication); see also The Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force and Settlement 
Conference Statistics, supra note 198 (providing statistics of the settlement conference 
statistics from the Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force). 
246 IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-9(a)(2)(B). 
247 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.5(b)(2). 
248 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c). 
249 Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(b)(2). 
250 Id. § 5-20-1-27(b). 
251 Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.6(b)(1). 
252 IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8.6(c) (West Supp. 2013). 
253 See Frequently Asked Questions About Foreclosures, COLO. LEGAL SERVICES (May 2012), 
http://www.coloradolegalservices.org/lawhelp/resource/frequently-asked-questions-
about-foreclosures?ref=qVArX, archived at http://perma.cc/5PKT-NJUW (concluding that 
this does not mean the homeowner is living in the house for free as monthly payments, 
interest, and penalties continue to accrue and are charged to the homeowner under the 
terms of the homeowner’s loan documents). 
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lender may not charge the homeowner for costs associated with the 
settlement conference process.254 
Other Midwest states also have settlement conferences or mediation 
procedures.255  In Illinois, both Cook County (including Chicago) and 
Will County (including Joliet) have a mediation program.256  Further, the 
Illinois Homeowner’s Rights Act requires lenders to provide 
homeowners notice of their legal rights and options and provide 
borrowers with an accurate statement of the outstanding mortgage 
balance within ten business days of the borrower’s request.257  This 
provision’s goal is to ensure that homeowners know “exactly how much 
they must pay to avoid foreclosure, . . . [thereby permitting] 
homeowners to quickly explore their options, such as refinancing [their] 
loan or selling their home to protect their equity.”258 
Iowa does not have a legislated mediation provision, but Iowa 
Mediation Service, a nonprofit organization, works with Iowa 
homeowners and lenders on foreclosure prevention and refinancing in 
five cities throughout the state.259  This is a joint program with the Iowa 
                                                 
254 IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-10(b)(1).  The Act also provides that “a person who is not the 
owner of real property . . . and who suspects that the [land or] property may be vacant or 
abandoned, may enter upon the premise[]” to secure it, remove trash from it, or maintain 
it, as long as the person does not enter any structure on the property.  Id. § 34-30-26-5(a). 
255 See generally HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE, FORECLOSURE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM MODELS STATE-BY-STATE, http://www.aboutrsi.org/ 
pfimages/ForeclosureMediationProgramModels_September2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K7GE-4XLU (outlining alternative dispute resolution 
programs in various states). 
256 See Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, CIR. CT. OF COOK CNTY. (2010), 
http://cookcountyforeclosurehelp.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/6NT2-PCL7 (stating 
the goals of the Cook County mediation program).  See generally PAMELA J. MCGUIRE, 
CLERK CIR. CT. WILL CNTY. NOTICE OF MANDATORY MEDIATION (2010), available at 
http://www.willcountycircuitcourt.com/forms/mediation/116.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K678-CS3S (explaining the Will County mediation program).  The Cook 
County mediation program reports that “38% of homeowners going through the 
[mediation program] have been able to save their homes” and an additional “12% have 
reached . . . a dignified exit.”  STATE OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, 
CHANCERY DIVISION MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT 
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Chancery%20 
Division/Forclosure%20Mediation/Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Progress%20Report%20J
une%202012%20(with%20Appendixes).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8PAL-42T4. 
257 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1504.5, 1505.5 (West 2009). 
258 Homeowner’s Rights, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (2010), http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
consumers/homeowners_rights.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PT4Y-CDSL. 
259 See generally Information on Iowa Mediation Service’s Mortgage Mediation Program, IOWA 
MED. SERV. (2008), http://iowamediationservice.com, archived at http://perma.cc/43BS-
XN5P (providing an overview of the services provided by Iowa Mediation Services). 
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Attorney General and is a voluntary program whereby borrowers and 
lenders meet with a neutral third party mediator to seek a resolution.260 
In 2008, Michigan enacted the Michigan Home Foreclosure 
Prevention Act, which permitted the commissioner to evaluate 
information about the lender and borrower and decide whether 
foreclosure action was necessary.261  Where suitable, the commissioner 
had the option to “extend the filing date for a foreclosure for up to 
[ninety days or] require the lender and the borrower to participate in 
mediation.”262  Effective December 22, 2011, House Bill 4543 required 
that a list of approved counselors accompany the complaint.263  A debtor 
had thirty days to contact one of these approved counselors and set up a 
negotiation with his or her lender.264  However, in December 2012, the 
Michigan legislature repealed these provisions.265 
Wisconsin has eleven counties with foreclosure mediation 
programs.266  In each of these programs, mediation is voluntary; both the 
homeowner and the lender must agree to mediate.267  For example, Dane 
County Circuit Court requires lenders to tell homeowners that they have 
an option to mediate their foreclosure cases and notify them of available 
resources, including a University of Wisconsin law student clinic.268  
There are also a number of websites available to assist Wisconsin 
homeowners.269  Indiana’s settlement conference legislation is not the 
                                                 
260 Id. 
261 AM. BAR ASS’N, RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION RESOURCES FOR ADR 
PROFESSIONALS (Feb. 9, 2009), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/DR_Foreclosure_Resource_Page.authcheckdam.doc, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4H24-PG2F. 
262 Id. 
263 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205a(2) (West Supp. 2013). 
264 Id. § 600.3205b(1). 
265 2012 MICH. PUB. ACTS 521 (effective June 30, 2013). 
266 Two More Counties Launch Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 18 THE THIRD BRANCH 3 
(Summer 2010), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/ 
summer10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/38Z5-DY8K.  Under the Milwaukee program 
nearly 50% of mediated cases are resolved with a modification of the loan.  Attorney General 
J.B. Van Hollen and The Metro Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation Program Announce New, 
Improved Process for Homeowners Seeking Mediation Services, WIS. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 26, 
2013), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/media-center/2013-news-releases/february-26-2013-0, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LDL3-M7DF [hereinafter Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation 
Program]. 
267 See generally Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra note 266 (discussing how 
foreclosure problems are solved through mediation). 
268 Karen Rivedal, UW Law Students to Give “Lifeline” through Foreclosure Mediation 
Program, WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.law.wisc.edu/news/Articles/ 
UW_law_students_give_lifeline_th_2010-01-28, archived at http://perma.cc/G9KX-72RN. 
269 See generally HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUND., http://www.995hope.org (last 
visited June 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3XZQ-FU8Y (providing an example of a 
website aimed to assist Wisconsin homeowners); TAKE ROOT MILWAUKEE, 
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state’s only response to the foreclosure crisis; it has also established a 
foreclosure prevention network. 
D. Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network and Other Midwest Foreclosure 
Hotlines 
As soon as the foreclosure crisis hit and thousands of families faced 
foreclosure, homeowner advocates recognized that homeowners were 
ill-prepared to represent themselves in the loss-mitigation process.  In 
response, Indiana and other states established foreclosure hotlines for 
homeowners to call a toll-free number for a referral to a housing 
counselor in their area, who would advise homeowners on what loss-
mitigation relief might be available to them and assist in their 
negotiations with their lender.270  In Indiana, the foreclosure prevention 
hotline is administered by the IFPN.271 
In early 2006, the Indiana Housing and Community Development 
Authority (“IHCDA”) met with various government agencies and 
industry leaders to discuss the foreclosure crisis and propose potential 
foreclosure-reducing solutions.272  The IHCDA developed the IFPN, 
which “worked with [state] elected officials to enable legislation for a 
[multi-tiered] solution to delinquency and foreclosure.”273  In November 
2007, the IFPN initiative was implemented, which “included a [targeted] 
public awareness campaign, a telephone helpline, and a statewide 
network of trained mortgage foreclosure counselors.”274 
The public awareness campaign encouraged homeowners facing 
foreclosure to seek help by visiting the program’s website at 
www.877gethope.org or calling the telephone helpline at 1-877-GET-
                                                                                                             
http://takerootmilwaukee.com/about-take-root-milwaukee.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/6WC8-RBZL (listing another example of a website that is 
focused on helping homeowners); WIS. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION NETWORK, 
http://www.mediatemilwaukee.com/Home_Page.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6J9Y-S543 (demonstrating that there are a variety of websites 
that are available to provide help to homeowners); WIS. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. AUTH., 
available at http://www.wisconsinforeclosureresource.com (last visited June 10, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LCH3-XL8T (providing another example of a website aimed at 
benefiting homeowners). 
270 See About, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION NETWORK, http://877gethope.org/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/K3BK-63SR (discussing Indiana’s 
foreclosure hotline, which connects homeowners with a certified foreclosure prevention 
specialist). 
271 Id.  The Indiana Housing and Community Authority created the IFPN to help reduce 
the amount of foreclosures after it conducted a series of meetings with government 
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HOPE.275  When homeowners call the helpline, they are referred to a 
“foreclosure prevention specialist” from a nonprofit organization to 
guide them through the foreclosure process and assist them with loss-
mitigation options.276  This “Don’t Let the Walls Foreclose in on You” 
public awareness campaign distributed over 350,000 marketing pieces.277  
The campaign also included radio, print, and billboard communications 
that targeted communities with the highest foreclosure concentrations.278  
Additionally, the IFPN hosted multiple events specifically designed to 
facilitate contact between borrowers, lenders, and housing counselors.279  
There were over 900 borrowers who met with their lenders or housing 
counselors during these events.280  The IFPN also partnered with other 
agencies to host a “Phone-A-Thon,” which provided homeowners the 
opportunity to seek foreclosure prevention advice from various agencies 
by simply placing a call.281  According to the Indiana Housing & 
Community Development Authority, over sixty thousand Hoosiers have 
received assistance from the IFPN, 3000 of which came from the “Phone-
A-Thon.”282 
The OAG and the Indiana Supreme Court also partnered together in 
additional foreclosure efforts, and have recruited and trained over a 
thousand pro bono attorneys to represent homeowners at settlement 
conferences.283  In addition, between 2009 and 2011, the OAG presented 
at forty-six foreclosure prevention seminars, including twenty-three 
Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) programs training pro bono 
attorneys and judges.284  Through these seminars and CLE programs, the 
OAG educated more than 2000 attorneys and judges.285  Including 
community fairs and other events, the OAG reached nearly 12,700 
                                                 
275 About, supra note 270. 
276 Id. 
277 IND. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. AUTH., Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network:  Marketing and 
Resource Development Services Request for Proposals 3 (2010), available at http://www.in.gov/ 
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284 Memorandum from Michelle Mayer, Outreach Section Chief, St. of Ind. Office of Att’y 
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Hoosiers.286  Furthermore, the OAG distributed more than 9000 handouts 
and other educational materials on mortgage fraud and foreclosure 
prevention to Hoosiers across Indiana.287  Recently, the IFPN received 
funding through the “Hardest Hit Fund” to assist unemployed 
homeowners in keeping their homes when their primary residence is 
subject to foreclosure.288 
Other Midwest states also developed a foreclosure hotline to assist 
homeowners facing foreclosure.  For example, Iowa Mortgage Help is 
sponsored by the Iowa Home Ownership Education Project, the Iowa 
Office of the Attorney General, Iowa Finance Authority, and the Iowa 
Mediation Service, Inc. (“IMS”).289  Homeowners seeking foreclosure 
prevention information may call a toll-free number, which will connect 
them with trained housing counselors prepared to assist them through 
the foreclosure process.290  Group counseling classes are also available in 
Des Moines and Cedar Rapids.291 
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority (“MSHDA”) 
operates a toll-free hotline that directs homeowners to a foreclosure 
prevention specialist in their county.292  This program also includes 
information on the website to assist homeowners who are experiencing 
financial difficulties or facing foreclosure, including information 
concerning Michigan’s statewide network of homeownership counselors, 
a second mortgage program to assist current MSHDA borrowers, and 
refinance programs for eligible homeowners.293 
                                                 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 See generally Indiana’s Hardest Hit Fund, IND. H. REPUBLICANS, http://www.in.gov/ 
legislative/house_republicans/2298.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X6YQ-CV4W (discussing how the “Hardest Hit Fund” gives financial 
assistance to individuals who have been most negatively affected by the recent poor 
economy). 
289 IOWA FIN. AUTH., available at http://www.iowamortgagehelp.com/ (last visited Nov. 
8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/FA63-Q5E5; Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Off. 
of the Att’y Gen., “Iowa Mortgage Help” Will Aid Home Owners Struggling with 
Mortgage Payments (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/ 
releases/feb_2008/Iowa_Mortgage_help.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C8HW-3MPV. 
290 Help for Homeowners, IOWA FIN. AUTH. (2014), http://www.iowamortgage 
help.com/homeowners/, archived at http://perma.cc/RWD7-8VMW; Supporting Home 
Ownership Education in Iowa:  Iowa Mortgage Help, IOWA HOME OWNERSHIP EDUC. PROJECT 
(2008), http://www.ihoep.com/newsdetails.php?newsId=2, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
J3WU-CH96. 
291 Supporting Home Ownership Education in Iowa:  Iowa Mortgage Help, supra note 290. 
292 Homeowner Education, MICH. STATE HOUS. DEV. AUTH., available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/mshda/0,4641,7-141-45866_62889_47905-177801--,00.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/6JS8-MCGB. 
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The “Save the Dream Ohio” hotline provides Ohioans facing 
foreclosure with legal assistance and contacts for HUD-certified housing 
agencies.294  Hotline operators also connect callers with the Ohio Benefit 
Bank, which helps the callers determine their eligibility for additional 
support in alleviating their financial burdens.295  In 2007, the Ohio 
Housing Financing Agency (“OHFA”) and the Ohio Department of 
Development’s Office of Housing and Community Partnerships 
established the Ohio Home Rescue Fund Program.296  The Ohio Home 
Rescue Fund Program aids homeowners by providing financial 
assistance to those who are “struggling to make their mortgage 
payments due to unforeseen, temporary life circumstances.”297  Between 
the 2006 and 2008 fiscal years, the program aided 762 households 
comprising roughly 2056 people.298 
The Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority 
provides a toll-free hotline, Homeowner’s HOPE, which is answered 
twenty-four hours a day by trained housing (credit) counselors who 
assist homeowners to “establish a budget, understand the terms of [their] 
loans, and talk with [their] financial institution.”299  Homeowner’s HOPE 
is also represented by its own website, which provides information and 
resources.300  In Illinois, programs have been developed for specific 
counties with high concentrations of foreclosure instead of statewide 
programs.  For example, in Cook County, homeowners who have 
received a foreclosure summons may call a toll-free help line to schedule 
a free meeting with a housing counselor.301 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Midwest’s high unemployment and preexisting economic slump 
has exacerbated the foreclosure crisis.  Both federal and state 
governments have responded with extensive foreclosure-prevention 
efforts.  While no single effort has been a panacea and each effort has 
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needed extensive amendments to improve its effectiveness, Indiana has 
developed an effective combination of programs.  These programs, 
combined with the OAG Robosigning Multistate Servicing Standards, 
the federal laws implemented in HAMP and HAFA, and the Dodd-Frank 
Act, have helped homeowners facing foreclosure.  However, the federal 
government still has not reformed the rating system, which also 
contributed to the foreclosure crisis and recession. Moreover, while 
Dodd-Frank tightened some of the underwriting practices that led to 
some homeowners purchasing homes without the ability to pay, there is 
a difficult tension between strict underwriting standards on the one 
hand, and ensuring that lower income families and first time 
homeowners have the opportunity for home ownership, on the other. 
Recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have come under criticism that 
they may be beginning to move toward some of the lending practices 
that contributed to large losses during the mortgage crisis.302 
Like other Midwest states, Indiana introduced a toll-free foreclosure 
prevention hotline that refers homeowners to trained housing 
counselors.  Nevertheless, Indiana is only now seeing significant 
improvement in the number of homeowners saving their homes through 
loss-mitigation efforts.  This is because of a critical combination of 
efforts, including the OAG Multistate and Best Practices Petition that 
responded to robosigning and other servicer abuses; legislation to 
provide homeowners with a right to a settlement conference where they 
meet face-to-face with their lender to determine their eligibility for a 
workout to save their home; and finally, the MFTCAP project, where 
Indiana courts take an active role in contacting the homeowner and 
facilitating the settlement conference process. 
                                                 
302 See Joe Light, Fannie and Freddie See Potential for Thaw in Mortgage Access (Nov. 6, 2014), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/fannie-mae-profit-falls-55-1415277851, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WD3V-FWMB (indicating that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may have 
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